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Introduction
The firm's choice of a research and development project (R&D project)
resembles a scholar's choiceoftopic for his next paper. Should the researcher
opt for a highly uncertain project, where the reward is large but the chance of
success is small, or should he choosea more certain project where the chance
of success is larger but the reward of success smaller? A firm's reward is a
profitable patent or other profitable assets. An economist's reward is to be
published in a well-knownjournal. Another example is that scholars, in the
same way as firms, must decide whether to pursue a conventional approach
or to pursue a more unusual approach. Despite the resemblance between
decisions made by academic scholars and firms, investment in R&Dhas until
recently been a relatively neglected research topic in mainline economics."
I have divided the introduction into three parts. First, I briefly present
the discussion of technological progress preceding the development of
industrial economics.Second, I briefly discuss some of the contributions from
industrial economicsto the understanding of technologicalprogress. The third
and last part narrows the focus to the specifictopics discussed in the thesis.
1. The discussion of technological progress before industrial
economics.
Classical economists after Adam Smith and throughout most of the
nineteenth century focused primarilyon long-term growth. In seeking the
causes of growth, non-Marxian economists emphasised the importance of
lSchmalensee (1988) p. 673: "It is also frequently noted that this subject [research and
development] has received much less study than its importance warrants." Stiglitz (1989)
p. 70: "Though [R&D and learning by doing] get far more attention today than they did a
decade ago, the disparity between the importance attached to them by economists (at
least revealed by their behaviour) and popular concern is remarkable".
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resources like land, labour, and capital. A pessimistic view was taken of the
prospects for future growth: economic growth was mainly attributed to an
increase in resources, not to technological progress. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century and during the first part of the twentieth, economists
developed what is now referred to as neo-c1assical economics. Tools for
analysing the optimisation of the use of scarce resources by firms were
developed. The setting was mainly static: long-term growth was ignored, while
much attention was paid to the study of shorter term business cycles.
Of course, not all economists have ignored the importance of
technological innovation. Karl Marx, and later Joseph A. Schumpeter,
forcefully argued that technological progress is essential for an understanding
of the dynamism of capitalist growth. As Marx and Engels stated in The
Communist Manifesto: "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly
revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relation of
production, and with them the whole relations of society." (Marx and Engels
(1848) Vol. 1, p. 36). Contrary to Marx, Schumpeter took a more
disaggregated view when he argued for the importance of technological
change in Business Cycles (1939) and in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (1942). Schumpeter traced all disrupting economic change to
innovations, and identified the innovator with the entrepreneur. By focusing
on the entrepreneur, which could be a firm and not necessarily a person,
Schumpeter was able to highlight the importance of competition and industry
structure for the innovating activities. Although the discussion does not
easily lend itself to empirical testing, Schumpeter at first stimulated mainly
empirical work.
The important role of technological progress in economic growth was
not fully recognised until the publication of the seminal papers of Moses
Abramovitz (1956) and Robert Solow (1957). In line with the classical
tradition, Solow and Abramovitz wanted to study empirically how much
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growth in per capita output couldbe accounted for by an increasing quantity
of capital and labour inputs. Both papers show that growth depended far
more on increasing the productivity of resources than on using more
resources. The methodologieswere such that the residual captured all causes
of rising output per capita other than rising input per capita. The residual
turned out to be surprisingly large. Abramovitzconsideredit as a "measure of
. "our Ignorance .
The large residual discussed in the papers of Solow and Abramovitz
provoked scholars to study its different components. This empirical research
was conducted parallel to the empirical research stimulated by the works of
Schumpeter.
2. The discussion of technological progress in industrial
economics.
Before the development of industrial economics, there were relatively few
theoretical investigations which addressed the questions raised by
Schumpeter. Through applying game theory as a tool, industrial economics
started to burgeon at the end of the seventies. With it a strand of the
literature focusing on the relationship between industry structure,
competition, and innovation has sprung up. As pointed out by Joseph E.
Stiglitz (1989) investigation of competing firms' incentives to develop new
technologies turned out to be a challenging part of industrial economics.The
modellingdifficultiescan at least partly explain why relatively fewfocusedon
technological competition at first.2 During the last ten years, the
understanding offirms' incentives to developnew technologieshas improved.
2 (1989) p. 70: "The difficulty of the topic - the absence of any consensus model- provides
one of the explanations for the lack ofresearch in this area".
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Industrial economics is not the only branch of economics focusing on
technological competition. Modern growth theory has also during the last ten
years incorporated technological competition. Increasingly, a Schumpeterian
approach is applied, where a firm's profit from its own innovation decreases
when a competing firm introduces a better technology.f
Recent developments in modern growth theory and industrial
economics show that the importance of technological progress for economic
growth is increasingly reflected in economic theory.
Before turning to an overview of the topics discussed in the thesis, I
briefly discuss some results obtained in industrial economics which may
serve as a starting point for the discussion of the approach taken in the
thesis.
Some questions on technological progress which have already been asked and
answered
Research efforts to develop innovations can be seen as production of
knowledge. Unlike conventional goods, knowledge can be used by all firms and
consumers in an economy without any extra costs, except the costs of
transmitting the information. Thus, knowledge is a public good in the sense
that it yields non-rivalrous use. From a welfare perspective, a public good
should be freely available to all agents in an economy.
However, profit maximising firms do not have an incentive to provide a
freely distributed good. Unless it is able to appropriate some of the social
gains generated by the resulting innovation or knowledge a firm will not be
willing to undertake a research project. One means of appropriating a portion
of the social gain is through a patent.
3See Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Segerstrom et. al.
(1990)
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Ever since the first patents were granted in fifteenth-century Italy,
patents have been used to give innovators of new products and processes
exclusive rights to their innovations for a specific period of time.s Patent law
thus reflects the trade-off between stimulating entrepreneurs to develop
useful knowledge (e.g. technology) on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
maximising the social value of existing knowledge through unhindered
dissemination and use of it. If the innovator is given exclusive rights to his
newly developed knowledge, he can charge a price for letting other firms or
consumers use the knowledge. With a strictly positive price for obtaining the
technology from the patent holder, some potential users who would have
gained by using the technology will refrain from paying the price. Hence, the
welfare gain of the knowledge is reduced.
The theory of optimal design of patent law has focused on two
questions: patents' length in time and their broadness of scope. The aim has
been to design a law which optimally trades off the dead-weight loss of
monopoly pricing with the need for providing incentives to develop new
technologies.s Until recently, the theory has focused on single innovations,
thereby ignoring the fact that an innovation often builds on other
innovations. However, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in
taking the cumulative aspect into account when analysing patent law. The
profit from the latest innovation must somehow be shared between the firm
with exclusive rights to the first innovation and the firm employing an earlier
innovation in a new innovation.f
As pointed out by Kenneth J. Arrow (1962, p. 615): "However, no
amount oflegal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of
something so intangible as information." It is impossible to enable a firm to
4See Kaufer (1988) for a discussion of the early history of patent grants.
5See e.g. Nordhaus (1969) Chapter 5, Scherer (1972), and Klemperer (1990).
6See e.g. Scotchmer (1991) and Chang (1995).
-5-
capture the whole gain buyers have from using a new technology, or the
whole gain later firms have from using the knowledge developed earlier. We
may, thus, expect that the incentives for developing new technologies will be
weaker than the socially optimal ones. However, this is not necessarily the
case.
In the literature it has been shown that the way in which research
units are compensated in the "market" may induce excessive research effort.
The firm which secures itself a patent will often get most of the rent of the
innovation." Hence, the institution of patents approximately mimics a rather
ruthless mode of compensation where the "the winner takes all". The social
value of an innovation is, however, equal to the difference between the value
of the best innovation and the technology which alternatively would have
been used: the second best technology. If we leave out the quality of the
innovations and focus only on the timing of new innovations, the value of an
innovation is identical to the gain of obtaining the technology earlier than the
innovation could have been introduced by any other firm. The patent system
does not provide the best firm with a compensation for the innovation which
is equal to the difference between the best and the second best technology.
Instead, the innovator will get an exclusive right to his new technology. This
exclusive right is often worth more than the difference between the best and
second best technology. The second best firm gets nothing.
This observation about the incentive scheme induced by the patent
system has been used to show divergence between firms' decisions regarding
development of new technologies, and welfare maximising decisions. In the
patent race literature, it has been shown that the firms can be induced to
invest more in developing a new technology than the socially optimal level.
,
This problem is related to the problem of the commons: an increase in a
7Also in the absence of patents, the firm developing a technology first may reap a major
share of the rent of the innovation.
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firm's R&D effort will transfer some probability for obtaining the patent from
its competitors to itself. Since a firm does not take into account rivals' losses
due to its own increased R&D investment, all firms may overinvest. We may
not only experience that all firms overinvest from a social point ofview, but
also that an excessive numberof firms may be attracted to the market.f
Besides the level of investment, a firm often makes other decisions
regarding its R&D project. A firm may, for instance, choose among uncertain
projects. Due to the "winner takes all" form of compensation, risk-neutral
firms will be induced to excessive risk-taking. The choice of a high-risk project
is privately beneficial because it raises the chance of discovering a very
valuable technology or of discovering the technology early and, thus, the
chance of winning the patent race. Also a social planner will take into
account that the expected value of a new patent will increase with a riskier
project. However, contrary to the firms, the planner does not take into
account that the firm undertaking a riskier project will more likely win. To the
social planner the identity of the winning firm does not matter. Consequently,
the firms have excessive incentives for risk-taking. The general conclusion is:
Given that the firm developing the best technology captures more than the
difference between the value of its own technology and the second best one,
there will exist a gap between the firms' R&D incentives and the social
optimal incentives.f
8See Loury (1979) for a discussion of the problem of the commons and Reinganum (1989)
for review of the patent race literature.
9See Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) for a more elaborated discussion of the firms' R&D
incentives when compensation scheme is approximately of the form "the winner takes all".
See also La Manna et al. (1989) for a discussion of patent races with multiple prizes.
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3. Themain topicsin the thesis
Empirical work by Mansfield (1986) and Levin et al. (1987) has shown that in
rather few industries is patent protection essential to the introduction of new
inventions. Furthermore, their studies show that the principal reason for the
limited effectiveness of patents is that competitors legally can "invent
around" patents: patent protection is not broad enough to prevent relatively
close substitutes from entering the market. One of the conclusions that may
be drawn from the works of Mansfield and Levin et al. is that patent
protection is seldom broad enough to ensure that "the market" compensation
for inventive activities is of the form "the winner takes all". In line with these
empirical results, the essays presented in the thesis assume that firms
develop competing technologies and that the technologies are not similar
enough to infringe the patents of the competitors. Since I mainly focus on
R&D in typical hi-tech industries, where empirical evidence shows that
patent protection is relatively inefficient in preventing introduction of
competing technologies, this should not be considered a serious limitation."?
The essays will point out other causes for differences between the private
and socially best R&D incentives than those discussed in the existing "winner
takes all" literature.
There is another significant feature that distinguishes four of the
following five essays from most of the existing R&D literature. I discuss R&D
incentives when standardisation and compatibility increase the utility a user
derives from a product. Standardisation and compatibility are appreciated
because theyensure that complementary products can operate together.
Examples include computers and software, CD players and CDs, VCRs and
movie cassettes for rental, camera and lenses. Ceteris paribus, buyers are
willing to pay more for products which adhere to a dominant standard than
IOSee the empirical work of Mansfield et. al. (1981), Mansfield (1986).
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for products that do not fit the standard. This extra willingness to pay for
compatible or standardised products is often referred to as a network
externality. The impact of network externalities on private incentives to
innovate is studied and comparedwith the sociallybest incentives.
Several articles have focused on how network externalities can result
in adoption of a standard other than the socially best. Il Another area of
interest has been hownetwork externalities, from a welfare perspective, can
induce the users to adopt a new technology too early or too late.12 However,
fewarticles have discussed hownetwork externalities influence technological
progress.
A firm that wants to developa new technologyneeds to ask itself: How
much should be spent on R&D?Howrisky should the R&Dproject be?When
is the best time to introduce a new technology?In a major part of the thesis I
study how the answers to these questions depend on the presence ofnetwork
externalities. I also compare the firms' R&Dincentives with the sociallybest
incentives.
Outline of the thesis
In the first essay, "R&Din Markets with Network Externalities", I study an
established firm's (incumbent's) and an entrant's choice among risky R&D
projects. It is assumed that the entrant can only introduce incompatible
technologies without infringing the patent of the incumbent firm. An R&D
project becomes riskier if the chance of success diminishes and the value of
the new technology in the event of success increases. I show that the firms'
R&D incentives differ from the socially best incentives, since the rivalling
llSee Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1986).
12SeeKatz and Shapiro (1990) and Farrell and Saloner (1985).
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firms do not take into account the loss suffered by previous buyers as a
result of the switch between technologystandards.
In equilibrium, the entrant will choose an excessively safe R&D
strategy. Contrary to the low risk R&D project chosen in equilibrium, a
riskier R&Dproject would,ifit succeeds,result in a technologyconstituting a
sufficiently large improvement to justify the loss brought upon previous
buyers through a switch of standards. Since the entrant ignores previous
buyers' losses,he will, in equilibrium, choosean excessivelysafe project.
However, the incumbent will, in equilibrium, choose an excessively
risky R&D strategy. By choosing a less risky R&D project, the incumbent
would reduce the probability of failure. In the model, a lower probability of
failure would make a switch of standard less likely. The incumbent's R&D
strategy is excessively risky, since the previous buyers do not compensate
the incumbent formaking a switch ofstandards less likely.
In the second essay, "R&DIncentives in Compatible Networks" (co-
authored with MarcelThurn),we explorefirms' incentives to improve existing
compatible technologies. Two firms are assumed to sell different, but
compatible technologies. A buyer's willingness to pay for any of the two
compatible technologieswill, due to increased network externalities, increase
with the number of buyers adopting one of the compatible technologies. We
show that a firm may find it profitable to cover market segments which,
viewed separately, are unprofitable. Covering such a segment can be
profitable since it will increase the network externalities and, consequently,
raise the profit in other segments of the market. If there is more than one
firm in the market, firms prefer that other firms cover market segments
which, viewed separately, are unprofitable. We show that a firm may
strategically underinvest in R&D to induce another firm to cover the
unprofitable market segments. Three different reasons for welfare losses are
discussed: First, none of the firms may decide to cover the unprofitable
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market segment, since a single firm cannot reap the total increase in
network externalities. Second, the firm best suited to cover the unprofitable
market segment may induce the other firm to coverit. Third, given the firms'
market shares in equilibrium, a firm may, due to strategic underinvestment,
have a less valuable technologythan the sociallyoptimal one.
The third essay, "R&D in the Presence of Network Externalities:
Timing and Compatibility", focuses on how network externalities influence
the timing of R&D investments. Here I analyse the incentives for
introduction of a new technology in an emerging market without any
established technologyor standard. I showthat two rivalling firms will, due to
network externalities, have excessive incentives to introduce a new
technology early. Not only will a welfare maximising social planner prefer
slower development, the firms may, in fact, also be better offif they develop
their new technologies later. By agreeing on common standards before the
new technologies are ready formarket introduction, the firms can remove the
incentives to introduce new technologies early. Hence, the firms' profits as
well as social welfare increase by common standards. This result suggests
that one of the motives for a growing number of alliances in the information
technology industries might be to determine common standards (design
features) in emerging markets. Common standards will reduce the firms'
incentives to engage in an expensiveR&Drace.
In this essay, different government policyinstruments are discussed. I
point out how a standardisation policyimposed by a government agency can
enhance social welfare given that the firm's R&D decisions are fixed.
However, I also show that a such standardisation policymay reduce social
welfare given that the firms can decide when to introduce new technologies.
Moreover, compulsory licensing of a new technologyfor a defined reasonable
per unit fee is shown to be a better public policy than a standardisation
policy.
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The last essay on R&D and network externalities, "Irreversible Choice
of Uncertain Technologies with Network Externalities: Comment", is a
comment on an article by Choi (1994). Choi studies an entrant's R&D
decision in a market where early buyers can observe the entrant's R&D
project and wait for the resulting new technology. He claims that from a
welfare perspective the entrant should choose the most risky R&D project
possible. The aim of my comment is twofold. First, in the setting introduced
by Choi I show that, contrary to what Choi claims, it may be profit
maximising as well as socially optimal for a firm to choose a low risk project.
Second, in a plausible model without network externalities but with buyers
who can wait, I show that a low risk project can be profit maximising as well
as socially optimal. Hence, network externalities are not vital for showing
that a low risk project can be welfare maximising as well as profit
maximising.
In the final essay, "R&Dwhen Adoption is Irreversible", I maintain an
assumption often made in the literature about network externalities: the
buyers adopt a technology only once. The impact of this assumption on the
timing of R&D investments is discussed in a setting without network
externalities. The new insight from this essay is that ifbuyers' adoptions are
irreversible and they can wait for new technologies, in a market with price
competition, the firms will have excessive incentives for early development of
new technologies. It is shown that these incentives differ from the incentives
for early introduction discussed in the literature about preemption and patent
racing. Price competition leads to excessive profitability of temporal product
differentiation.
-12-
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Chapter 1
R&D in Markets with Network Externalities·
Abstract
This paper studies the consequences ofnetwork externalities on R&Drivalry
between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all
differences between the R&Dprojects chosen in market equilibrium and the
socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare
perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain
R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is
used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in
equilibrium than in the socialoptimum.
JEL classification: 031, L13.
*1am grateful for comments from Geir B. Asheim, Anette Boom,Petter Osmundsen, Ulf
Pedersen, Ariel Rubinstein, Mette D. Storvestre, Marcel Thum, and two anonymous
referees. This research has been financed by Telenor and The Foundation for Research in
Economics and Business Administration. Forthcoming in International Journal of
Industrial Organization.
-17-
L Introduction
Network externalities are the positive effects one owner has on other owners
of the same or a compatible technology. Examples of such effects are found
in markets for sophisticated goods such as computers and software, cameras
and lenses and communication equipment. In these markets an owner will
value a broad range of complementary goods and services. Hence, he will be
willing to pay more for goods that have or are expected to have a large
variety ofrelated products. Usually, a large number of owners of the same
good will ensure a broader supply of complementary goods than is the case
with a smaller number of owners. The supply of software to a particular
computer, for instance, will broaden when the number ofbuyers increases. A
buyer will favour products owned by many to products owned by a few.! This
phenomenon is frequently named network externality.
Markets with network externalities are often characterised by intense
R&D rivalry. In the computer industry the rate of R&D investment to sales
has been well above 10%for many years.s
Even though investment in R&D is very important in markets with
network externalities, there have been few attempts to thoroughly discuss
the possible impact of network externalities on firms' choice of R&D projects.
So far the discussion has mainly focused on the adoption of new products, not
on how new technologies came into existence in the first place: the invention
of technologies.3
Since the existence of network externalities is of importance to the
adoption of a new product, it will also influence how firms search for new
technologies. Will network externalities induce firms to choose riskier
1See Katz and Shapiro (1985) for more examples.
2See Rosen (1991) for a discussion of R&D in the computer industry.
3See Katz and Shapiro (1986) (patented technology) and Farrell and Saloner (1985 and
1986) (not patented technology) for a discussion of the adoption decision.
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projects, or will they instead choose projects that they are almost sure will
succeed? The different R&Dprojects will be ranked according to the mean
preserving spread criterion, see Rothschild and Stigliz (1970).4 Besides
discussing the market equilibrium, I shall also compare the market
equilibriumwith the welfaremaximizingoutcome.This will enable us not only
to study the possiblewelfare loss related to the adoption or lack ofadoption of
a new technology, but also the welfare loss related to the firm's choice of
sociallyinferior R&Dprojects.
In this paper it is assumed that an entrant can only enter with a new
incompatible technology. However, the incumbent may introduce a new
compatible generation of the existing technology. In this setting I show that
the entrant's profit maximizing R&D project is less risky than the socially
best project. The entrant will not take into consideration the earlier buyers'
loss caused by a switch of standards. Hence, the entrant may choose an
R&D project which, if it succeeds, does not constitute a technological
improvement large enough to coverboth the earlier and the new buyers' loss
caused by a switch of standards (in addition to the R&D costs). A riskier
project will, if it succeeds, result in a more valuable technology than the
project chosen in equilibrium. Consequently, a riskier project will, if it
succeeds, constitute an improvement sufficiently large to coverboth the new
and oldbuyers' losses caused by a switch of standards.
Like the entrant, the incumbent will focus on the new buyers and not
take the earlier buyers' welfare into account when he decides which R&D
project to pursue. If his R&D project fails and the entrant's succeeds, the
entrant will enter the market with a new technology (standard). Since the
incumbent will not take into account the earlier buyers' losses caused by the
4A mean preserving spread may somewhat inaccurately be defined as moving probability
weight from an outcome close to the mean to an outcome further away from the mean,
keeping the mean constant.
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adoption of a new standard, he will from a social welfare perspective choose a
too risky project. A less risky project will increase the probability of success
and thereby make adoption of a new technology less likely.
Katz and Shapiro (1992) and Choi (1994) discuss development of a
new product in a market with network externalities. Katz and Shapiro focus
on the timing of a product introduction in a market where both the incumbent
and the entrant have exclusive rights to their technologies. The entrant's
R&D decision is to decide when to develop the new technology given declining
development costs over time. Katz and Shapiro show that with incompatible
technologies an entrant will, since he is not taking into consideration the loss
of network externality brought upon owners of the incumbent technology,
have excessive incentives to develop a new technology. Not only does the
entrant have excessive incentives to develop the new technology, the welfare
loss is also enlarged by premature development.
Choi (1994) studies an entrant's choice among R&D projects with
different risks. The incumbent technology is unchanging and supplied
competitively. The buyers enter sequentially and the first buyer can observe
the R&D project of the entrant. Choi shows that the private and social R&D
incentives may differ. Assume that the expected value of the entrant's
technology given it is used by only one user (stand-alone value), exceeds the
incumbent technology's stand-alone value plus the network externality. If
there is no uncertainty about the outcome of the R&D project, the entrant
will always enter in the second period and the first buyer will always lose the
benefits of compatibility by adopting in the first period. The anticipated loss
of network externality may induce the first buyer to wait until the new
technology is available.
Increased uncertainty may change the first buyer's decision. With an
unfortunate R&D outcome in the second period, the entrant will stay out of
the market. Consequently, even if the incumbent technology is bought in the
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first period, there is a strictly positiveprobability ofreaping the compatibility
benefits. Hence the first buyer may adopt the incumbent technology
immediately. Ifthe loss in demand reduces the profit more than the entrant
gains by being able to choose the riskiest R&D project, the entrant will
choose the riskiest R&Dproject that prevents the first buyer from buying
immediately.5 Since Choi shows that the riskiest R&D strategy is the
socially optimal one, it followsthat the entrant may choose a too safe R&D
strategy. In the modelpresented in this paper a new reason for the entrant to
choose a less risky R&D project than that which is socially optimal is
identified.
The organization of the article is as follows: Section II presents a
description of the model. The market equilibrium is analysed in Section III.
Section IV characterizes the welfare optimum and compares it with the
market equilibrium. SectionV concludes.
ll. TheModel
2. 1 The buyers
The buyers enter the market in two groups. The first group consists of N
buyers who enter market before a potential entrant can introduce a new
technology. It is assumed to be infeasible or prohibitively costly for these
buyers to postpone purchase until the entrant's technologyis available. After
the entrant may have introduced a new technology, the second group of
buyers enters. To simplify, I have assumed that the last group consists of
onlyonebuyer.
5Given the demand, the expected profit will increase by a mean preserving spread because
the new technology will only be used if it is more valuable than the old one.
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Let the stand-alone value of the incumbent's present technology (the
technology bought by the first group of buyers) be a. If the incumbent
succeeds in developing a new technology, it is assumed to be compatible with
the old technology.However, the entrant will onlybe able to enter with a new
incompatible technology.
The marginal gain or network externality from one new buyer is
assumed to be independent of the number of earlier buyers and equal to b.
Thus, a buyer's value of adopting a technologywith x adopters at the end of
the last period is bx.
2.2 The R&Ddecision
Assume that an R&Dproject can only have one of two outcomes: success or
failure. Only successful projects result in development of a new technology.
The firms can choose among projects with different probabilities of success.
Amore uncertain project (i.e, lower probability of success) will, if it succeeds,
lead to a larger technological improvement than a more certain project.
Assume that the expected stand-alone value of the incumbent's new
technology, t, is unaffected by the choiceofR&Dproject such that
t = iV(i)
where i e (0,1] is the probability of success chosen by the incumbent, and
where V(i) is the stand-alone value given that the project succeeds.
According to the mean preserving spreadcriterion, a project is riskier, the
smaller i is. The production costs are ignored for simplicity; V(i) should be
interpreted as the net valuation ofthe new product.
If there are no R&D costs related to choosing a riskier R&D project,
the incumbent will always seek to do so. Since he has already developed a
technology,he will only apply the new technologywhen it is an improvement.
Thus, he will, even in absence of competition, choose the most uncertain
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project." These incentives will also prevail when the incumbent is facing
competition. I will, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987),assume that the R&D
costs are increasing in risk, and thereby avoid this comer solution (maximum
risk). According to Dasgupta and Maskin (1987): "The intuitive idea behind
this assumption is that [the. riskier a project] the more "unusual" is the
research strategy and thus the more costly in terms of materials and so
forth." For simplicity, let the R&D costs be quadratic and a decreasing
function of the success probability:
C(i) = 1..r(l- i)2 .
2
r is a parameter which is large if the cost of choosing a riskier project is
large."
Similarly, let Vee) and C(e) be respectively the consumer's stand-alone
valuation of the entrant's technology (given a successful R&D project) and
the entrant's increased costs from choosingan uncertain project given that e
is the probability of a successful project.
t = eV(e) 1C(e) = - r(1-e)2
2
ee(O,I].
Later we will need the followingassumption about the cost function
and the expected stand-alone value of a new technology:
Assumption 1
L
(t + bN)(t +a + bN)r> .
bN
ll. t>a+2bN.
Grrhe incumbent will, by choosing the most uncertain project, (lowest i feasible) maximize
expected consumer valuation in the next period: (1- i)a + i t]! .
7Another approach is taken by Rosen (1991). He assumes that the expected value of the
new technology is declining in risk. Applying this assumption instead of the chosen
assumption will not change the qualitative conclusions in this paper.
-23-
Part (i) states that the parameter of the R&D cost function is above a
certain level that is negatively related to the size of the network externalities.
Part (ii) states that the expected value of the existing technology, including
the network externalities ofboth buyer groups, is below the expected stand-
alone value of a new technology.
2. 3 The firms
The firms will engage in the following two period game.
Period l
The incumbent and the entrant simultanously choose one risky R&D project
each. Both firms take into consideration that the incumbent has an installed
base of size N.
Period2
The outcomes of the R&D projects become known to both firms and the firms
compete on price (Bertrand competition). The buyer chooses a technology.
Depending on the outcomes of the R&D projects, the Bertrand
competition yields the following equilibrium prices in period 2:
Entr§!nt InS;;l!mb~nt Entrant's~ Ins;;umbent's price
Fails Fails ° a+b(N +1)
Fails Succeeds ° V(i) + b(N + 1)
Succeeds Fails V(e)-a-bN °Succeeds Succeeds Max[O, V(e) - V(i) - bN] Max[O, V(i) + bN - V(e)]
Knowing the equilibrium prices in the second period, it is straightforward to,
show that the following two functions are the incumbent and entrant's
expected profit:
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n1(i;e) = (1- e)(1- i)[a + b(N + 1)]+ (1- e)i[V(i) + b(N + 1)]+
eiMax[O. V(i) + bN - V(e)] - C(i). i e (0.1]
(1)
and
nE(e;i) = e(l- i)[V(e) - a - bN] + eiMax[O. V(e) - VU) - bN] - C(e).
e e (0.1] (2)
Given that both firms have developed a new technology, the firm that can
offer the largest consumer surplus will capture the buyer. Its profit is
maximized by setting its price so that it matches the maximum consumer
surplus the competingfirm can profitably offer.
The incumbent's profit function is indexed with 1, (n~) if
Max[O. V(i) + bN - V(e)] is replaced by its first element and 2 ifit is replaced its
secondelement (n;). The entrant's profit functionis indexed similarly.
The situation outlined in the two stages above can nowbe analysed as
a static game where the firms solely choose the risk of their R&Dprojects (e
and i) and where the profits are givenby (1)and (2).
m Equilibrium
To find the equilibrium (or equilibria), we need the two firms' reaction
functions.
Given the other firm's choice of R&D project, a firm has to decide
whether to choosea lowrisk project without profit opportunities ifboth firms
succeed or a riskier project with profit opportunities. By choosing a risky
project the firm will have a technology which is sufficiently valuable to
capture the market even if the other firm succeeds as well.
Let e be defined as the entrant's project(s) which makes the
incumbent indifferent between a projectwith and without profit opportunities
ifboth firms succeed,i.e. maxi n~(i;e) = maxi n;(i;e). Let I be similarlydefined.
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Lemma 1.
l. If eexists, it is unique. Given e < e, the incumbent maximizes 7r~(i;e),
otherwise he maximizes 7r;(i;e).
u: If I exists, it is unique. Given i < I, the entrant maximizes 7rk(e;i),
otherwise he maximizes 7r~(e;i)
Proof. See the appendix.
The firms' reaction functions, RE(i) and R](e), can now be derived from
the first order conditions of the profit functionsf
RE(i) = argmax7rE(e;i)
e
1
1-!(1- i)(a +bN)_ r
- 1
1- r (t + (1- i)a +bN) if
if iS I (3)
' > -:-l _ l
The incumbent's reaction function can be derived similarly:
R](e) = arg max 7r](i;e)
I
1
1l--(l-e)a_ r
- 1
1- r((l-e)a+t-ebN)
if eSe (4)
if e~e
The upward sloping reaction functions imply that i and e are strategic
complements+ If a finn chooses a riskier project, the other finn will follow suit
and choose a riskier project as well.
SIf i sl, RE(i) is given by the first order condition of 7rk(e;i).
If i ~ l, RE(i) is given by the first order condition of 7r~(e;i).
9See Bulow et al. (1985) for a precise definition.
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Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, there is a unique Nash equilibrium where
the incumbent wins if both R&D projects succeed.
Proof. See the appendix.
The incumbent's installed base makes it unattractive for the entrant
to choose a sufficiently risky project to win the market if both firms' R&D
projects succeed. The entrant's profit will be larger ifhe chooses a less risky
project with a larger probability of success. However, in the event of success
it will not result in a sufficiently valuable technology to win if the incumbent's
R&D project succeeds as well.
As discussed in Section II, a firm will always prefer a riskier project if it
does not increase costs and if the firm already has a technology. The
marginal income of choosing a riskier project is positive. In our case, the
entrant's project is only profitable if the incumbent's project fails. The
probability of failure is (1- i). If the incumbent's project fails, the entrant is
able to capture the (new buyer's) whole increase in consumer surplus caused
by his own R&D project. The expected increase in the consumer surplus (the
profit) is the difference between the expected value of the new technology less
the expected loss from not buying the existing technology, (1- i)(t -e(a+ bN)).
The expected value of the entrant's technology is constant, but the expected
gain from buying the new technology instead of the existing technology
increases with the degree of risk. A risky project will seldom succeed and
induce the new buyers to buy the new technology instead of the existing one.
Hence, a riskier project will not increase the expected value of the new
technology, but make the expected loss from not buying the existing
technology less.
The incumbent will also be able to capture the entire increase in
consumer surplus by providing the existing technology or an improved
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technology to the new consumers. As in the case of the entrant above, a
riskier project will not increase the expected value of the new technology, t,
but reduce the probability that the buyers have to give up the alternative
purchase (whichis the existing technologyor the entrant's new technology).
Proposition 2.
Assume that the network externalities increase, (i.e. b or the size of the installed
base, N, increases).In equilibrium,
a. the entrant will choosea riskier R&D project.
b. the incumbent will choosea more certain project.
c. the adoption of a new technology will become less likely.
Proof. From the reaction functions it followsthat the equilibrium is
e= r2-(a+t)(a+bN) and i= i-(a+bN)2-r(t-bN)
r2 -(a+bN)2 i -(a+bN)2
By differentiating e and iwith respect to b and by using assumption 1, we
get respectively de/db< o and ii/db> o which prove proposition 2 a and 2 b; e
declines and i increases as the network externalities grow. The same results
are obtained by differentiating with respect toN instead ofb.
Anew incompatible technologywill be adopted if the incumbent fails to
improve the existing technology, and the entrant succeeds in his R&D
project. The probability of this event is given by (1- i)e. By 2 a. and b. we
know that this probabilitywill decrease with an increase in b. Q.E.D.
The intuition for proposition 2 is as follows.An increase in the installed
base will not influence the marginal cost ofchoosinga riskier project, i.e. C'(e)
is unchanged. Furthermore, we know that the entrant's profit is identical to
the rise in expected consumer surplus resulting from his R&Dproject. Hence,
we may infer that if the value of the existing technology is increased, the
entrant's profit is reduced. By choosing a riskier project, the buyers'
-28-
probability ofhaving to give up the existing technologywith its more valuable
installed base declines and the value of the entrant's R&Dproject increases
accordingly. Hence, a more valuable existing technology will increase the
entrant's incentives to choosea riskier project.l?
The consequences of a larger installed base advantage are quite
different for the incumbent. Given that the entrant's R&Dproject fails, the
incumbent will always capture the gain by having a larger installed base. In
this case, the risk of the incumbent project will not matter. However, if the
entrant succeeds the incumbent will only capture the gain if he succeeds as
well. Hence, an increase in the installed base will increase the incentives for
choosinga more certain project - a project which succeedsmore often.
V. Welfaremaximizingchoices
In the previous section the equilibrium in the game is characterised. In this
section the equilibrium strategies will be compared with the welfare
maximizing R&Dchoicesofa welfare maximizing socialplanner.
A social planner will not only maximize the expected value of the
winning technologyin the last period. Unlike the incumbent, he will also take
account of the previous buyers' welfare. Adoption of an incompatible
technology will, as discussed in the introduction, harm the owners of the
obsolete technology.
Socialwelfare is definedby
W(i,e) = (1- e)(I- i)[a+ b(N + 1)+bN] + (1- e)i[V(i)+ b(N + 1)+ bN] + (5)
e(l- i)[V(e) + b] + eiMax[V(i)+ b(N + 1)+ bN, V(e)+ b] - C(i) - C(e).
lOAn increase in N will reduce the entrant's profit, (1- i)(t - e(a + bN)), and increase the
profit of a marginally riskier project, (1- i)(a + bN).
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Let W(i,e) be indexedby 1 (Wi) ifthe last square brackets are replaced by its
first element (the incumbent's technology is adopted), and by 2 (W2) if the
brackets are replaced by its second element (the entrant's technology is
adopted).
In the cases where the incumbent wins and a new technology does not
capture the market, the existing buyers will obtain bN as increased network
externalities.
Let l be defined as the incumbent's choiceof a project which makes a
socialplanner indifferent between assigning a high risk project and a lowrisk
project to the entrant, i.e. max, WI(l,e) = max, W2(l,e). If a high risk project is
assigned, it is always welfare maximizing to let the entrant capture the last
buyer. However, if the low risk project is assigned to the entrant, the last
buyer should only adopt the new standard if the incumbent's project (l) fails.
Let e be similarlydefined.
Lemma2.
1,. If e exists, it is unique. Keep e fixed. If e< e, the social planner
maximizes W2(i,e) with respect to i, otherwise W'(i,e) is maximized.
1,1,. If l exists, it is unique. Keep i fixed. If i < l, the social planner
maximizes WI(i,e) with respect to e, otherwise W2{i,e) is maximized.
Proof. See the appendix.
The incumbent's socially best response to the other firm's R&Dchoice
is given by
S[(e) = arg max W(e;i)
e
l
1
1--(1- e)a_ r
- 1
1- r(I-e)a+t-2ebN) if
if eS; e (6)
e~e
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Similarly, the entrant's socially best choice is
SE(i) = arg max W(i;e)
l
1
1-.!.(1- i)(a + 2bN)_ r
- 1
1- r(t+(I-i)a+2bN) if
if i ~l (7)
Proposition 3. There is a unique pair of R&D projects which is socially
optimal. In optimum, the incumbent has a superior technology and captures
the last buyer if both projects succeed.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1.
Without an installed base, the entrant will have to choose a very risky
project to win if both projects succeed. It is better to assign a less risky
project to the entrant and let him win only if the incumbent fails to improve
his technology.
Before we continue, let us draw the socially best response functions
and the firms' reaction functions in a figure.
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e1 .__-----------__,..-..,..----""'7I 1,1
Certain
projects
~------------~----------------------~~~~i0,0
Risky projects
1
Certain projects
Figure 1. The market equilibrium. and the socially optimal choice.
In Figure 1, the pair of R&D projects which are socially optimal is denoted
(iw,eW) and the equilibrium. is denoted (i.e).
We are now ready to compare the equilibrium. with the social optimum..
Proposition 4. Without network externalities (b = OJthe social optimum and the
market equilibrium are identical.
Proof. Compare (6) and (7) with (3) and (4). Q.E.D.
By substituting 2b for b in the firms' reaction functions, we get the
socially best response functions. A social planner will not only take account
of the new buyer's gain from compatibility, which is bN, but alsothe previous
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buyers' gain, which is also bN. Hence, the gain from compatibility is 2bN and
not only bN as taken into consideration by the firms when they compete for
the buyer in period 2.
Hence, in a market without network externalities, the profit
maximizing firms will also maximize social welfare. The private and social
incentives for choosing a particular R&D project correspond. This proposition
enables us to focus solelyon market failures due to network externalities.
Proposition 5.
(a) Compared to the socially best R&D choices, the incumbent chooses a
too risky R&D project and the entrant choosesa too certain project.
(b) The probability of adoption of incompatible technology is larger in
equilibrium than if social welfare is maximized.
Proof. The only distinction between the reaction functions and the first order
condition of the welfare maximizing problem is that b is replaced by 2b in the
first order conditions. By proposition 2, an increase in b induces the entrant
to choose a riskier project and the incumbent to choose a less risky project in
equilibrium. This establishes proposition 5. Q.E.D.
The probability of a loss of network externalities will decrease if the
entrant chooses a riskier project. If a riskier R&D project succeeds, the size
of the technological improvement may justify both the previous and the new
buyers' loss of network externalities. Hence, social welfare increases if the
entrant chooses a riskier project than that given by his reaction function.
Contrary to the entrant, the incumbent chooses a riskier project in
equilibrium than that prescribed by the first order condition of the welfare
maximizing problem. The incumbent does not take account of previous
buyers' possible loss of network externalities when he makes his R&D
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decision. The probability of a loss of network externalities (i. e. e(l- i)) will be
reduced by a choice of a marginally less risky R&D project than that given by
the incumbent's choice in equilibrium .
My results relate to the issue of excess momentum and excess inertia
discussed in the literature, see for example Katz and Shapiro (1992) and
Farrell and Saloner (1986). Like in Katz and Shapiro (1992), the entrant's
incentives to introduce a new incompatible technology may in my model
result in excess momentum - incompatible technologies are adopted too often
from a welfare perspective. Excess inertia is possible if present buyers adopt
the incumbent technology and ignore that future buyers might have gained if
a new and incompatible technology had been adopted instead.U Since the
model in this paper does not include buyers entering after period 2, excess
inertia will never occur.
As discussed previously, Choi (1994) argues that the entrant may
choose a less risky project than optimal from a welfare perspective.
However, in Choi's paper the entrant does so to induce the first period buyers
to wait until the entrant enters. This is, as we have seen above, not the
argument in my model.
v. Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper I have developed a simple model of R&D decisions in markets
with network externalities. Many markets with network externalities can be
characterised by intense R&D rivalry and a key question is whether the
incumbent's and entrant's R&D incentives differ from the socially optimal
incentives.
llFarrell and Saloner (1985) studies how asymmetric information among buyers or co-
ordiantion problems may result in excess inertia.
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In the paper I show that the incumbent chooses a too risky R&D
project that too often lets a new firm with an incompatible technology enter.
In addition, the entrant has an incentive to choosemore certain projects than
are socially optimal and these strengthen the possibility of adoption of an
incompatible technology.
Our discussion might be extended in various directions. Contrary to
many markets, in markets with network externalities a buyer's expectation
about the others' choiceof technology is important. If all buyers expect that
the others will choosea particular technology, they may choose the same (or
a compatible one) to obtain the network externalities. However, another
(incompatible) technology may be chosen if it is expected to be the market
standard. Hence, due to network externalities, there may be multiple
equilibria for given prices (see Farrell and Saloner (1985).Here I have been
able to ignore possible co-ordination problems by assuming that only one
buyer enters in period 2.12However,the buyers' problems in co-ordinating on
a particular standard may have an impact on the firms' R&D incentives. A
thorough analysis of the formation of buyers' expectations in relation to the
firms' R&Dinvestments wouldbe ofgreat interest.
Another interesting extension would be to let an R&D project have
more than two feasible outcomes (success or failure). A firm may very well
develop a technology that is better than nothing but not as good as wanted
when the R&Dproject was initiated. This possibility may alter both firms'
R&Dincentives.
121n papers where there are many buyers, it has been common to assume that (identical)
buyers are able to co-ordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium. See. e.g. Katz and
Shapiro (1986).
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Appendix
Proofof lemma 1. Let g(e)=M~n:(i;e)-M~n;(i;e), i.e. g(e) is the profit
I I
difference if the incumbent does not capture the last buyer and if he does in
the case where both R&D projects succeed. Hence, g(e) =O. Let il maximize
n}{i,e) and ~ maximize n;(i,e). e is unique since
g(e) = -(1- i)(il - iJa - (te + (ebN - t)i2)+_!_r(1- i2)2 -_!_r(l- il)22 2
and
g'(e) = (~- i2)a - t - bNi2 < O.
If e E (0,1], there is no feasible R&D project the entrant can choose to make
the incumbent indifferent between capturing the period 2 buyer and not doing
so given that both projects succeed. Because g'(e) < O the incumbent
maximizes n~(i;e) if e < e and n;(i;e) if e > e.
Similarly, it can be proved that l is unique (if it exists) and that the
entrant maximizes n~(e;i) if i < l and n~{e;i) if i > l. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1. The entrant will independent of what project the
incumbent chooses never find it profitable to capture the period 2 buyer if
both projects succeed. This follows since by (3), the riskiest project that the
entrant is willing to undertake ifhe intends to serve the period 2 buyer, given
that both projects succeed, is
1eO =1--(t +(l- O)a+ bN)r
which combined with assumption 1 (i), implies that eO > 1_ bN
t+bN
or
equivalently,
V( eO) =~ < t + bN.
e
Hence, project eO will not result in a better technology (including the network
externalities) even if the incumbent chooses the project i =O (the
incumbent's project which results in the lowest stand-alone value given
success). It follows that RE(i) is continuous and affine for i E (0,1].
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Let el = RE(O+). Now, el > eO since by (3), the entrant will choose a less
risky project given that he does not seek to capture the period 2 buyer if both
projects succeed. Furthermore, eO ~ e, since,for e ~ e", the incumbent always
captures the period 2 buyer if both projects succeed. Hence, el > e. Since
e = e is the only point of discontinuity for R1(e), (4) implies that R1(e) is
continuous and affine on [el,1].
Byusing Assumption 1 combinedwith (3) and (4), it is straightforward
to show that R1(el»0, R1(1)<I, and RE(I)=l. Hence, RE(R1(e)) is a
continuous and affine function from [el,l] to [el,l], with RE(R1(el))>el and
RE(R1(1)) < 1.Bya standard fixedpoint argument it followsthat there exists a
unique equilibriuma,e) satisfying e= RE(i) and i = R1(e). Q.E.D.
Proofoflemma 2. Let f(e)=M~WI(i;e)-M~W2(i;e). Hence, f(e)=O. Let i;
I I
maximize Wl(i;e) and i; maximize W2(i;e). e is unique because
f(e) = (1- e)(i; - ina + (i; -()(t+ eb)+ e(t+ i;b(2N +1))-
.*( b) 1 (1 .*)2 1 (1 .*)212 t+e - 2 -Zt +'2 -l2
f'(e) = -(i; -i;)a+ t+2(bN > O.
and
Furthermore, we can infer that if e < e the incumbent's socially best project
is a low risk project which does not win the last buyer if both R&D projects
succeed (f'(e) >O). If e > e, the socially best project is a low risk project
where the incumbent only captures the last buyer if the entrant's project
fails.
Similarly, it can be proved that l e (0,1] is unique (ifit exists) and that
a social planner wants the incumbent to capture the last buyer if i < I and
the entrant if i> l .Q.E.D.
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Abstract
Network externalities describe the phenomenon that a good becomes more
valuable to each user the more other consumers use the same or a
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L Introduction
In economic terms, a network effect occurs when a good becomes more
valuable to a user as more consumers adopt it or a compatible product, i.e.
when demand is interdependent. Examples include computers,
communication networks and video equipment. The decision to join such a
network involves an externality because the new buyer does not take into
account the positive effect on other users. For instance, a buyer who
considersjoining a communicationnetwork will not take into account the fact
that other users gain fromhaving onemore participant in the network.
Since the seminal papers ofFarrell and Saloner (1985, 1986)and Katz
and Shapiro (1985, 1986),the literature on network externalities has pointed
out many market failures that are distinctive for demand interdependence.
However, little has been said so far about the incentives to carry out R&Din
these markets. Apart from a few exceptions, the existing literature has
focused on the introduction of new products with given characteristics and
with a given group ofconsumers."This is especiallysurprising as innovations,
cost reductions and the subsequent enlargement of markets, have strong
spillovers into the related markets of compatible products (because of the
network effect).Even if firms operate in different specialisedmarkets and are
not direct competitors, the network effect can create an important
interdependence between disjoint market niches. A firm investing in R&Dto
covernew, previouslyunprofitable markets expands not onlyits own installed
base but also the installed base for other compatibleproducts.
To illustrate this point, take the emergence of computer reservation
systems (CRS) as a highly stylized example. Computer reservation systems
are used for booking flights, rental cars or accomodation. Initially, CRSwere
mainly designed for internal purposes. Airlines wanted to automate seat
lIn the concluding part, we will relate the results ofthese few papers on R&D and network
externalities to our own findings.
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reservation and ticketing, car rentals wanted to optimize the utilization of
their car pools. The computer reservation system ensures that each
transaction is immediately accessible worldwide. As there was no
intercommunicability between the systems, each reservation system was
designed solely for a market niche of specialists. With a more widespread use
of these systems, it was recognized that there is a significant potential for
network benefits from communicability.s The gain from communicability,
however, would only show off when there existed a broad access to the
computer reservation systems. Therefore, the CRS had to create access for
the big number of travel agents. This opened a new 'mass market' beyond the
specialists' market niche. In order to reach the new clientele, a huge
investment in the CRS was necessary. Besides the expansion in the
computing center, most resources were spent on the software improvement.
The travel agents' software should be easily accessible and the travel agents
should benefit from added features such as back-office accounting. Just to
give an impression of the magnitude of the R&D costs: the initial development
of the Apollo airline CRS cost $ 400 million; to improve the Apollo CRS for the
travel agents $ 1 billion had to be put into R&D effort. This policy lead to a
rapid diffusion of CRS among travel agents in the US; the CRS access of
travel agents rose from a negligible number to 95 per cent during the 1980s
[Katz (1988, p.88)].3
The expansion of a market like the one for CRS might require huge
investments in R&D. Once the step is taken and the travel agents already
20f course, the data sets of the different CRSs were not fully compatible, but as all
necessary information was already available in computerized form it was not prohibitively
expensive to convert the data sets. That the development of ex post compatibility is a
practicable way is shown by the manifold acitivities in Electronic Data Interchange (ED!).
3Competition between airline CRS is negligible as the regional differentiation of the market
is very strong. We also neglect the problem ofvertical integration between airlines and CRS
which has led to several regulatory measures in the past. See Guerin-Calvert and Noll
(1991) for a comprehensive survey of the CRS business.
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have the computer facilities, it becomes relatively easy and inexpensive to
establish links to further reservation systems. Other reservation systems
than for the airlines (Apollo and Sabre in the US) have definitely benefitted
from the efforts of airline CRS. Hotel chains and car rentals could either set
up their own CRS access for travel agents or join an existing network by
selling their products through the established CRS.4 Because of this network
effect, all CRS providers could benefit if the market can be extended to a
mass market including the travel agents. However, the development of
inexpensive and convenient CRS access may require huge investments in
R&D and the question of which firm willleave its market niche and try to
cover the mass market arises.
The relation between network effects and R&D efforts gives rise to a
number of interesting questions for economists. To what extent will firms
carry out R&D in order to expand their installed base? Can we expect the size
of the installed base to be socially efficient? Why do we observe so many joint
ventures in markets with large network externalities? Examples where firms
are taking advantage of a common installed base can be found in the business
news almost every day. Producers of consumer electronics co-operate with
music and film companies, media giants search alliances in the
telecommunication business, and software developers in different specialised
segments establish coalitions. From all these issues, this paper will focus on
the questions of which R&D incentives emerge in markets with network
externalities and of whether private and socially optimal R&D efforts match.
We will concentrate on cost reducing R&D, i.e. process innovations. However,
our approach can easily be adapted to the case of (compatible) product
innovation.
4The first option was prevented by the airline eRS. Sabre and Apollo prohibited the travel
agents to use their eRS terminals for other purposes. Hence, the airline eRS can almost
completely control the access to other reservation systems.
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We will show that network externalities are not only important when
firms are competing face to face, but also when they invest in R&D in disjoint
markets. Because of the positive externality, the innovating firms
underestimate the value of larger future market shares. Successful R&D
projects allow a firm to cover new markets that were unprofitable with the
original high cost technologies. These innovations not only open new markets
but also increase the value of the traditional market through the network
effect. However, too little R&D is undertaken as the innovator ignores the
positive effects such an expansion of markets creates for other firms with
compatible products. While this effect on R&D is intuitively appealing,
network externalities may also cause more, and less, obvious distortions. If a
firm decides to invest in R&D to cover additional market segments, it will
generate a public good benefiting all other firms with compatible products.
Each firm might want other firms to provide the public good (network value)
because it might not be profitable to serve the additional market segments
itself. The question of who will provide this public good becomes a source for
strategic considerations and investment in R&D can be used as commitment.
As a result ofthis strategic behaviour, it cannot be taken for granted that the
least cost innovator will cover the additional market segments and thereby
provide the beneficial public good. Furthermore, firms may have strategic
reasons for underinvestment in markets with network externalities and this
underinvestment amplifies the inefficiency due to an inferior installed base
mentioned above.
The paper is organized as follows. In part II, we will set up a simple two
stage game where two specialised firms first decide on their R&D
investments and thereafter sell to the consumers. Part III sets up the profit
maximization problem of the firms, Part IV solves the game and discusses
the market equilibria that may exist. Part V compares the market outcomes
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to the social optimum. Part VI concludesthe paper and relates our findings to
the existing literature onR&Din network markets.
fl. The Model
We assume that two firms (A and B) are offering differentiated but
compatible products. On the demand side, the market is split into three
groups of buyers where each buyer considers to purchase one unit of the
product or no unit at all. Twoofthese groups are highly specialized users who
strongly prefer one of the two products. The first group includes a identical
buyers who prefer the product offirm A (market segment A).The second user
group is of the same size (a) but prefers firm B's product (market segment
B).Assume for simplicity that the users in the two market segments put the
same value on their favoured products. Let s denote the value of the good,if a
representative buyer is the only user of the technology (stand alone value).
Network benefits are not included in s.We will further assume that these
buyers are highly specializedand will never buy the non-favoured product, i.e.
their valuation of the non-favoured product is always less than the minimum
feasible cost of this product.
Besides the two groups which strongly favour one or other of the
products, we have a group of less advanced buyers. Wewill refer to this third
group as mass users. Let ~ be their stand-alone value and let the size of the
group be 1-2a, i.e. the total number ofbuyers in the three groups together is
normalised to 1.As they do not favour any of the special features, they are
indifferent between the two products and value them less than the specialists
(~< s).
A user's willingness to pay, however, is not only determined by this
stand-alone value, it also depends on the number of compatible users. The
network effect makes a good more valuable the more buyers that use a
compatible product. Even though the firms are selling differentiated products,
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their products are compatible. Therefore, the buyers in one market segment
will gain by an increase in the number of buyers in the other market
segments. This interdependence between the market segments causes a
network externality. The users' valuation of the network effect is assumed to
be linear in the number of users with the same or a compatible product. If all
three groups buy the same or compatible products, each buyer will be willing
to pay v in addition to the stand-alone value of the product due to the network
effect. If only the two advanced market segments purchase, each of the
buyers will be willing to pay 2av in addition to the stand-alone value.f
On the supply side, the firms (A and B) face a two stage game. In stage
1, both firms invest in R&D projects that will determine their marginal costs."
Iffirm i (i = A, B) does not invest in R&D, its marginal cost will be ei at stage
2. A reduction of the cost by di requires an investment of I,(di)' with Ii' (di) > O
and Ii" (di) > O. Hence, the marginal cost of firm i at the second stage is
This R&D investment will influence the market outcome in stage 2 of
the game, where each firm sells to the buyers in its own specialized market
segment. If the R&D investment is sufficiently large, the low cost firm may
want to capture the mass users as well. This increase in the installed base
will create spillover effects in the specialized market segments - on the firm's
own market segment and on the competitor's segment.
The firms seldom take their R&D decision simultaneously. Instead of
letting the timing of the R&D decisions beendogenously decided in the model,
5By assuming full (instead of partial) compatibility between the two products, the niche
buyers are indifferent about whether firm A or B covers the mass user market. In contrast
to our introductory example, it is furthermore assumed that the network effect is also
effective if only market niches prevail. This makes the model easier to manage without
losing significant insight,
6The cost reducing investment does not need to be an R&Dproject, it can just as well be
an investment in new capital equipment or training of the work force. However, R&Dis the
main source of cost reduction in the markets we are discussing,
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we simply assume that the firms choose their R&D projects sequentially, and
the firm to enter first is drawn randomly." Our model requires that the first
firm is able to commit itself to an R&D project. This assumption is plausible
in markets where such commitment can be carried out by writing contracts
with external R&D agencies or by choosing a particular direction for the R&D
project which does not allow to serve the mass users. In the CRS example,
the airlines mayenter into contracts with software firms to develop the new
software needed for their reservation systems. Since we cannot know which
of the two firms will be the first mover we introduce an initial stage (stage O)
where the first mover in the investment process is randomly determined and
this preplay randomization becomes public knowledge. We denote this stage
thepublic randomization stage.s The timing ofthis game can be summarized
as follows:
Public
Randomization
Firms A and B each invest
in an R&D project
sequentially.
I
Stage O Stage 1
The firms sell
their products.
I ~ Time
Stage 2
Figure 1. The time structure.
To narrow the focus of the paper to the impact of network externalities
on R&D investments, we will make two further simplifying assumptions.
First, the firms can discriminate between the two market segments by
setting different prices. This assumption enables us to focus on the welfare
7To simplify the analysis we ignore the possibility that firms may consider to delay their
R&D choice. Consequently, we avoid war of attrition types of equilibria; see, e.g.,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
SSee Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for a discussion where the players make their actions
contingent on the outcome of a public randomization device.
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losses due to network externalities and to neglect market failures that are
discussed thoroughly in the generalliterature on R&D investments,"
Second, we will assume that a firm will never find it profitable to serve
the mass user market if the willingness to pay of its advanced segment does
not rise (i.e. without the spillover effect in the specialized market segment).
The firms never reduce the marginal cost of production (ci - di) below the
maximum willingness to pay of the mass users (~+ v). Hence, the paper is
restricted to cost reductions in the interval:
di e [O, Ci - ~- v) i=A,B (1)
Using this assumption, we can ignore situations where the firms compete for
the mass user market.
Ill. The Firms' Decision
We solve the game backwards by starting with the second stage and later
discuss the first stage. At the second stage, the firms take their marginal
costs as given and set prices to maximize their profits. Knowing the second
stage profit for different cost levels, the firms invest in cost reducing R&D at
the first stage. In this multi-stage game with observed actions, we will
restrict ourselves to subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Stage2
If firm B does not serve the mass user market, firm A's profit at the second
stage is the maximum profit from either serving only segment A or serving
the mass users as well as segment A:
9 For instance, investments in R&D might be too low, because firms cannot capture the
incremental net social surplus accrueing to its own customers. This will be the case if a
firm is unable to price discriminate and, therefore, has to lower the price for its niche
buyers to capture the mass users.
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Firm A will be indifferent between the two alternatives if its marginal cost is
c == §.+ (1+ a)v, which implies a cost reduction by dA = cA - c.
If the mass user market is served by firm B, the profit of firm A is
a(s +v- CA + dA). By assumption (1) it will not be profitable to compete for the
mass user market.
Firm B has a profit function similar to firm A. Given that the mass
user market is not served, firm B will serve the mass user market only ifits
marginal cost is below c, which implies that the firm has reduced the cost by
more than dB = CB - c.
Stagel
At stage 1, the firms have to decide on the amount of cost reducing R&D
investment. The investment of firm i may depend on whether or not the other
firm is serving the mass user market.
Given that firm B does not serve the mass users, firm A will choose dA
if cA-dA>c
if CA - dA ::;C
The first line represents the profit if firm A serves market segment A only,
and the second line represents the profit ifthe mass users are served as well.
If firm A decides not to capture the massusers, the profit is maximized by a
cost reduction of size d~:,
lA (d~)= a
If the profit is maximized by selling to the mass users as well, the optimal
cost reduction is d~*:,
lA (d~*)= (1- a)
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AB the size of the specialized market segment a is smaller than the market
share of mass users and specialized users together (1- a), the cost reduction
will always be greater in the second case, d:* > d: .
If firm B is expected to serve the mass users, by assumption (1), firm
A will never consider capturing these buyers. In this case, the profit of firm A
is given by:
TIA(dA,dB) = a(s + v- CA+ dA) - IA(dA)
which is maximized by d:. This level of cost reduction is the same as the
optimallevel of cost reduction in the case where the two firms only serve their
own market segments.
Let TI;(d:,d;), TI;(d:*,d;), and TI;(d:,d;*) be the maximum profits of
firm i if neither of the firms serves the mass users, if firm A serves the mass
users and iffinn B serves the mass users, respectively.
We can now illustrate finn A's decision by showing the profits in the
three cases. lrA (-) denotes the gross profits before the R&D investment is
subtracted. The slopes of the gross profit curves are a and (1- a), depending
on whether the firm in question is serving the mass users or not. The R&D
costs are represented by the convex curve 1. (Firm B's decision can be
illustrated similarly.)
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J-L: Firm A's net profit iffirm B covers the mass user market.
K-L: Firm A's net profit ifneither of the firms covers the mass user market.
M-N: Firm A's net profit iffirm A covers the mass user market.
Figure2. Firm A 's profit.
IfK-L is larger than M-N, firm A will not serve the mass user market
even if the other firm stays out of that segment. In the opposite case, firm A
will serve the mass user market. Of course, firm A always prefers B to cover
the low price segment (the mass users), i.e. the profit J-L exceeds K-L and M-
N.
It is worth noting that d: might be larger than dA .10 In this case, it is
always optimal for firm A to choose d:* - given that firm B does not cover the
low price segment. (We williater see that this situation may induce strategic
underinvestment.) Moreover, if d: < d:* < dA, firm A will never choose the large
cost reduction d:*. It is not profitable to serve the mass users because profit
10Figure 2 illustrates the case where d: < dA < d:* .
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M-N is always smaller than profit K-L. Hence, in this case d: will always be
the profit maximizing cost reduction.
IV. TheMarket Equilibrium
We are now ready to discuss the different feasible market equilibria in
the game. To obtain a better overview, the possible market outcomes are
summarized in the following table:
case investment in R&D Which firm will serve
for mass users? the mass market?
case 1 no investment none
case 2 investment low cost firm
case 3 depending on the timing
case 4 strategicprovision of the R&D investments
Table 1. Market outcomes
Case 1
First let us focus on the situation where neither of the firms invests enough to
find it profitable to sell to the mass users at the second stage (i.e. K-L is larger
than M-N in figure 2). Depending on the outcome of the public randomization,
each firm can be assigned to the second mover position. Firm A and B's best
response functions as second movers are drawn in figure 3. The two axes
represent the decision variables dA and dB' The criticallevels, d;, are drawn
with dashed lines.
Given the initial production costs ei' the R&D costs are sufficiently
large to make it unprofitable for any of the firms to capture the mass users.
The best response function of the second mover is a straight line. As the first
mover's choice has no influence on the second mover, the first mover will
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choosethe optimal cost reduction for his market niche as well. Hence, none of
thefirms' decisions has an impact on the other firm's R&D investment.
Whatever the competitor does, none of the firms can gain by deviating from
the lowR&Dinvestment level. The unique market equilibrium is El' (d:,d;),
where the two firms stick to their respective market niches and neglect the
mass user market.
I I
d·~--------~----~,------~I
B •I
--------. ----T-------
I
I----r------01I I
I
dB~--------
o
......
£A A lI!ic - ('-V UA Al A
Figure3. None of the firms covers the mass user market.
Case2
In the second case, one of the firms has sufficiently low initial production
costs ei or R&Dcosts to find it profitable to cover the mass users (i.e. K-L is
smaller than M-N in figure 2).Without loss of generality, let this be firm A.
However, iffirm B is covering the mass users firm A's best choice is to stick
to its own market segment (i.e, J-L is larger than M-N).Moreover, we know
that firm B onlywill cover the mass users if it reduces the cost by more than
dB' Hence, if firm A is the secondmover, its best response function will jump,
from d:* to d: at this level.
Firm B is still assumed to have sufficiently large R&D costs to never
find it profitable to cover the mass users. If firm B is the second mover, the
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best response function is the straight line at d;. Whoever gets assigned to the
first mover position, (d~*,d;) will be the unique equilibrium (E2 infigure 4).
I
d* IB~--------------~~----~
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Figure4. Firm A is covering the mass user market.
Case3
In the last two cases, we have multiple equilibria. The market outcome
depends on the public randomization. In this case, imagine that each firm
finds it profitable to cover the mass user market if the other firm does not.
Now, both firms have a discontinuous response function as the second mover.
As shown in figure 5, there are two equilibria inpure strategies.
The market outcome will depend on the sequence of the firms'
investment. Given that firm B can commit itself to an investment first, d; is
the optimalIevel of cost reduction. Firm B anticipates that the best response
of firm A is a high investment level (d~*)where the mass users are served by
firm A. The equilibrium is denoted E3, (d:*,d;) in figure 5. ,Moreover, there
exists another equilibrium E4 where firm A moves first and forces firm B to
serve the mass users, (d:,d;*). Generally, the first mover has the advantage
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of committing himself to the low investment level and forcing the follower to
increase the installed base.
dB----------
---T------- I
d**BI-------+--.
I---r-
____ ol
I
I
I
: .....
o
Figure5. Both firms are willing to serve the mass users.
Case4
In the discussion above, we have implicitly assumed that di* < lI;. As noted
before, this may not be the case. By reversing the inequality for both firms we
get a new situation where the firms might strategically underinvest in R&D.
Following the reasoning in case 3, one firm undertakes a large
investment to cover the mass user market while the other firm only invests
to cover its own specialized segment. As ( is now above lI;, even the firm
which is not expected to serve the mass users will find it profitable to cover
this market if the other firm refuses to do so. Despite a relatively small R&D
investment, the firm is better offby covering the mass users.
Knowing this, (d:*,d;) may not be an equilibrium. Firm A has the
second mover position and is expected to serve the mass user market in this
case. Instead, firm A could invest slightly below dA. This low cost reduction is
a credible commitment by firm A indicating that it is not able to produce
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profitably for the mass market. Thereby, firm B is induced to cover the mass
user market as both investment levels d; and d;* are above the criticallevel
dB' This strategy will pay for firm A if the profit at the underinvestment level
dA exceeds the profits at d:" where the firm would have to cover the mass
user market. Suppose that each firm has a higher profit at the commitment
level, fl;, than with serving the mass market; then both firms will find the
underinvestment strategy profitable.U
What is the new equilibrium? The first mover, i, will choose the
underinvestment level li; and the second mover j has to serve the mass
market with a cost reduction of d;", i.e. the only equilibria are CdA'd;·) and
Cd:",dB)' To see this, assume there is a rule RCdA, dB) determining which of the
firms will serve the mass users at the second stage given both firms are
above their criticallevels, fl; Ci=A,B).Such a rule may, for instance, say that
the producer with the lowest production cost has to sell to the mass users. As
long as there is an option of avoiding selling to the mass users, this cannot be
an equilibrium. The firm which has to serve the mass users would have
chosen a different investment level. If both firms invest above the critical
level, there will be such an option.The firm which has to serve the mass users
can choose the commitment level, fl;. (It is never optimal to invest below li;
as this moves the firm further away from the profit maximizing level di·') The
two possibleequilibria are illustrated in figure 6.12
lIThe cases where neither, or only one, firm or only one firm is willing to invest li(ilJ to
induce the other firm to cover the mass user market is relegated to the appendix.
12The precise shape of firm A's and firm B's reaction functions in the interval
[dB,cB - ~ - v] and [dA ,CA - ~ - v] respectively depends on the rule R(dA'dB).
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o
·Figure6. Strategic underinvestment.
In equilibrium Es (d:* ,dB), firm B is the first mover and will (as firm A did
above) strategically underinvest in R&D. The production cost at the second
stage will be larger than the level that maximizes the profit, given that firm B
could commit itself to serving its own market segment only. The best
response of the second mover is to invest IA(d:*) and to provide the public
good (i.e. serve the mass users).
V. WelfareAnalysis
We have seen above how network externalities make the R&D investments
of firms more interdependent than in markets without this kind of
externalities. In this section, we will show that this interdependence gives rise
to welfare losses not previously discussed in the literature. This will be done
by comparing the market equilibrium (or equilibria) with the choices of the
social planner who maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and profits. As
the firms can exert perfect price discrimination, all surplus will go to the
producers and the buyers will be left without any consumer surplus. Hence,
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the social planner can use the sum of the two firms' profits as a measure of
welfare.
Assuming perfect price discrimination, there will be no room for market
failures apart from failures due to network externalities. The firms can
appropriate all benefits from sale to their own customers (including the gain
from lower costs) and in most markets there will be no additional benefits.
However, in markets with network externalities, there are additional benefits
that are not taken into account by a profit maximizing firm. In this section,
we will point out which types ofwelfare losses may arise in network markets.
The discussion will focus on three types of social inefficiencies. First,
the mass users may not be served even though welfare increases by including
these users. Second, there are outcomes where the wrong firm, i.e. the one
which has to do the most expensive R&D to serve the mass users, will do it.
Third, one of the firms may invest less in R&D than is socially optimal in
order to induce the other firm to cover the mass users. Put differently,
strategic behaviour, which is facilitated by network externalities, might be
socially harmful.
To analyse these inefficiencies we have to compare the welfare levels
under three options for the social planner: neither of the firms covers the
mass users (Wo), firm A (WA) or firm B (W B) covers the mass users. In each
case, the welfare is given by the sum of the firms' profits. Given the number
ofbuyers, the socially optimallevel of cost reduction is the same as the profit
maximizing level (di' or di").
Wo = a(s + 2av-cA + d:)+ a(s + 2av- CB+d;) - IA(d:) - l» (d;)
WA= a(s +v- CA + d:*)+ a(s + v- CB+ d;)+ (1- 2a)(J:+ v - CA + d:*) - lA(d:*) - IB(d;)
WB= a(s + v- CA +d:)+ a(s + v - CB+ d;') + (1- 2a)(J: +v - CB+ d;') - IA(d:) - lB(d;*)
We are now ready to compare the alternatives and discuss how the
above mentioned welfare losses may occur in an unregulated economy.
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Will the firms serve too few buyers in equilibrium?
By comparing Wo and WA, we can see whether it is socially optimal to let firm
A serve the mass users - given firm B produces only for its specialized users.
From a social point ofview, the mass users should be covered if Wo < WA• In
order to relate the social optimum to the private decision of firm A, we may
rewrite the welfare functions by substituting in firm A's profit function:
WO<WA
n
TIA(d:,d;) < TIA(d:*,d;)+ a(l- 2a)v
Private and social rankings are identical except for the last term. a(l- 2a)v
represents the gain that will accrue to the buyers in segment B, if firm A
includes the mass users in the network.P We will, therefore, never get a
market outcome where firm A is covering the mass users even though it
reduces the social welfare. There is a bias toward not serving the mass users
even if this increases social welfare. This bias is due to firm A's disregard of
the benefits in the other market niche. The market failure will be more
important (the loss will be larger) the larger the network externalities, and the
more customers in segment B can gain by including the mass users in the
installed base.t+
13By covering the mass user market, the installed base is increased by (1- 2a) new users.
Hence, the additional network value for each of the a users in the B segment amounts to
(1- 2a)v.
14The bias discussed above will be the same whether firm A or firm B is the candidate for
serving the mass user market.
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Will the wrong firm seroe the mass users?
Besides the question whether the mass users should be served, there is a
second source for welfare losses. Given that the mass users are served, will
the sociallybest firm cover this segment? To answer this question we have to
compare the welfare levels WA and WB where firm A or firm B respectively
innovates for the mass user market. If the followingcondition is fulfilled, the
welfare is maximized by firm A serving the mass users:
WA;:::WB
n
a[(d:* - d:) - (d;* - d;)] + (1- 2a)[( CB - d;*) - (CA - d:*)]-
- [lA (d:*) - lA (d:)] + [lB (d;*) - lB (d; )] ;:::O
(2)
The first two terms represent the change in production costs by letting firm A
serve the mass users instead of firm B.15The last two terms represent the
change inR&D costs.
Depending on which of the two firms invests first, the socially inferior
equilibrium might be the market outcome. The sum of the production costs
and the R&Dcosts can be lower if the other firm is serving the mass users.
An example might help to illustrate the fact that the market might
select the inefficient firm to sell to the mass users. To simplify the welfare
discussion, we assume identical R&D cost functions for the two firms. Even
though the two firms are starting from different initial cost levels ci (i = A, B),
both firms have to spend the same amount of R&D investment to achieve a
cost reduction of di' This assumption also implies that both firms have the
same optimal levels of cost reduction d: = d; and d:* = d;*. Then (2) reduces to
15The three terms represent market segment A, segment B, and mass user segment,
respectively.
-59-
(2')
and the decisionrule of the socialplanner is to choose
firmA if CA s CB and
firm Bif CA > CB.
Only initial cost differencesmatter. The firm with the lower initial production
cost should cover the mass user market.
However, there is no mechanism to link the market outcome to this
efficiency rule. The first mover - which is determined randomly and not
according to cost considerations - can avoid the costly R&D investment and
force the follower to serve the mass market. This dilemma describes the
second type of R&D inefficiency in markets with network externalities. As
there are no side payments between the two firms, the selection of the
Pareto-dominant outcome in an unregulated economyis not certain. The firm
with the largest innovation costmight be induced to provide the installed base
as a public good.
Are the firms reluctant to invest the socially optimallevel?
For the third type of inefficiency - the strategic underinvestment - it will not
be necessary to set up the formal calculus of the social planner (see figure 6).
Besides the welfare loss due to the inefficient firm serving the mass users, an
additional welfare loss emerges immediately from the reduced R&D
investment. If only the specialized market is to be served, d; is the private
and social optimal cost reduction. A strategic reduction of the R&D
investment aimed at keeping the production costs sufficiently high (to avoid
covering the mass users) increases only the profit of the firm, while it reduces
the social surplus. The welfare will increase if the firm not serving the mass
users increases its investment until the marginal R&D cost is equal to the
marginal reduction in production cost at the second stage.
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VL Conclusion
This paper discusses how network externalitities create interdependence
between firms' R&D decisions. Most of the R&D literature has focused on
interdependence that emerges from positive technological spillovers across
firms. Examples of such direct spillovers include imitation of non-patented
technologies, hiring other firms' employees and re-engineering patented
products to circumvent patent protection.lf In this paper we point out that
the network externality among buyers of compatible goods can create similar
effects even in the absence of technological spillovers.
Even though little work has been done on R&D in network markets,
there are some papers which are related to our paper. Katz and Shapiro
(1992) discuss an entrant's timing in introducing an incompatible product.l?
Since an entrant ignores the loss of network externalities suffered by users of
the incumbent technology, the incentives for the entrant to introduce the
product early will be too strong. Moreover, a later entry would give the
entrant more time for product development and make the new technology
more valuable. An improved technology will, to a large extent, justify the loss
of network externalities. Hence, the authors come to the same conclusion as
we do; too little R&D is conducted in the market equilibrium. In contrast to
our paper, however, the underinvestment emerges from competition with an
incompatible innovation.
The papers by Choi (1994) and Kristiansen (1994) focus particularly
on the risk of R&D projects. They show that network externalities may result
in divergence between R&D projects which are socially or privatelyoptimal.
16See, e.g., Arrow (1962), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), and Griliches (1991) for a recent
survey of the empiricalliterature.
17The paper analyses incentives to achieve compatibility as well.
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In Kristiansen (1994), both an established finn with an installed base and an
entrant can engage in R&D projects. If the R&D projects succeed, the
entrant will have a new incompatible technology and the incumbent a new
compatible technology. ABin the paper of Katz and Shapiro, a welfare loss
emerges because the incompatible technology succeeds too often. The
network effect of the installed base is neglected by both the entrant and the
incumbent. The incumbent finn chooses a too risky R&D strategy and - due
to a large probability of having an unsuccessful R&D project - too often it
leaves the market to the new incompatible technology. Moreover, the entrant
chooses an R&D strategy that is too safe. If the entrant succeeds, the
outcome is not innovative enough to make it socially worthwhile to relinquish
compatibility with the installed base.
A similar result is obtained by Choi (1994) where the incumbent
technology is competitively supplied and the (stand-alone) value of the good is
stochastic. The buyers decide whether to adopt the incumbent technology
immediately or to wait until the new incompatible technology is available. To
induce the buyers to wait for the new technology, the entrant has to choose a
sufficiently safe R&D strategy that will succeed with a large probability at
the time it enters. The entrant will - as in Kristiansen (1994) - choose an R&D
project that is too safe compared to the welfare optimum.
In contrast to these papers, we have focused on markets with
compatible products. This is not to say that all products in markets with
network externalities are fully compatible, but that network effects link
different market segments even if the suppliers are not in direct competition.
This setup may be especially relevant in the emergence of new markets.
Leading a market from a minor market niche to a mass user market that can
effectively exploit the network effects requires significant resources to be
devoted to the development of new inexpensive products. Finns have first to
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invest in cost reducing R&D to be able to provide the public good 'installed
base' later on. How this is done in network markets is the focus ofthis paper.
The network effect makes it valuable to develop products for a broad
user market. Without the network effect, the mass user market might be
privatelyand socially unprofitable. The incentive effects to carry out R&D in
these markets resemble the problems known from the literature on the
private provision of public goods.tf First, the market participants
underestimate the value of the public good 'installed base' because they
neglect the network value for the other market niches. Therefore, too little
R&D is undertaken. Second, even if both firms are willing to serve the mass
users, each firm will prefer the other firm to do it. The question of who should
provide the public good becomes the subject of strategic interaction, and the
firm with high R&D costs might be induced to produce for the mass user
market. Third, firms might strategically keep their production costs high so
as to commit themselves to not serving the mass users.
Despite all the possible inefficiencies, it is difficult to observe the
market failures directly. For instance, if the first type of inefficiency arises,
the product will typically never become a mass user good - which is precisely
the inefficiency. The public good is not provided, and the market can never
take off because the network value remains too low. It is difficult to find
simple empirical support. However, the mechanisms analysed might be
helpful in understanding some of the merger activities in recent years. The
integration of, for example, media and telecommunication business can be
seen as a means ofinternalizing the positive effect that a firm's R&D efforts
have on others (due to network externalities). These R&D investments will be
necessary to develop products that are, at best, needed in minor market
niches today but that might be dominant entertainment products (video-on-
18See Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) on the private provision of public goods and
Konrad (1994) on the commitment effect.
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demand, interactive TV)in the future. The trade-off between internalizing
network externalities and the risks of market power may soon become
relevant for the policyevaluation in regulation and anti-trust.
Appendix
In case 4 (part IV),we analyzed the situation where both firms have optimal
levels ofcost reduction above {l; and prefer underinvestment over serving the
mass market. We chose this case because it most clearly shows the strategic
motive of underinvestment. In this appendix, we discuss the outcome if at
least one of the firms prefers the interior solution with a high cost reduction
over the commitment strategy.
Case4'
In contrast to the discussion in part IV,we assume that both firms are never
willing to keep their costs at the commitment level ei - (l; to induce the other
firm to cover the mass users. It is better to cover the mass user market than
to move to the strategic position of underinvestment, i.e. lri(d;) < lri(di**) for
i=A,B.
Starting with stage 2, we solve the game backwards. As before, the
rule R determines which firm has to cover the mass user segment if both
firms have invested above the critical levels {l; at the first stage:
R:{dA,dB} ~ {A} v {B}.
The rule for stage 2 will have impact on the investment decision at
stage 1. Letj denote the first mover and i denote the secondmover.Given the
investment level of the first mover (dj), the second mover can choose an
investment level which induces the first mover to cover the market or an
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investment level where he covers the mass market himself. Let d~ (dj) be the
optimal reduction in costs given that the first mover covers the mass market
d~(dj) = arf~axili(di) Dj = {'v'dj:R(di;dj) = j}
I J
and let diS(dj) be the optimal reduction in costs given that the second mover
covers the mass market
diS(dj) = ar~~~xili(dJ
Decidingwhether to cover the mass user market or not, the secondmover will
compare the two profit levels. He will serve the mass market if
ili(diN(dj)) < ili(d;(dj )), and not serve the market if ili(d~(dj)) > ili(diS(dj)).
The first mover can choose a cost reduction level d, e Ei which induces
the second mover to cover the mass user market, or he can choose a cost
reduction level dj e Ej where
Ej = {'v'dj:ili(d~(dj))> ili(d;(dj))} and Ei ={'v'dj:ili(d~(dj)) < ili(d;(dj))}.
The first mover will serve the mass users if
max il. (d.) > max il .(d.)
djeEj J J djeE; J J
and the secondmover will serve the mass users if the inequality is reversed.
If the first mover serves the mass users, he will invest Ij(d;*), i.e. he
will not underinvest strategically. However,if diN(d;*):t di*, the second mover's
cost reduction will be different from the optimal level for strategic reasons
given that he serves his advanced segment only.
If the first mover chooses an investment level which implies that the
second mover has to serve the mass users, i.e. d, e Ei' he may invest
strategically. If d; e; Ei and the first mover only covers his own advanced
buyers, the chosen cost reduction will be different from the optimal cost
reduction level due to strategic reasons.
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Case4"
So far, we have analyzed the cases whereeach firm preferred the
commitment strategy of underinvestment (see case 4) and the case where
neither of the firms is willing to invest only Ii(Ci;) to induce the other firm to
cover the mass market. The only case left is the intermediate one. One firm
favours the commitment strategy of underinvestment at d and the other
firm favours the large cost reduction of d": As this is a special case of the
preceding analysis we can shorten the discussion. There are two cases to
discuss:
(a) IIj(dj) < IIj( d;*)
IIi(d;» IIi(di**)
for the first mover and
for the secondmover
If the second mover is willing to reduce his costs only by a;, the first
mover cannot commit himself to not selling to the mass users. Hence, the
only equilibrium is (d;*,an!maXIIi(di)). If di*;t: an!maxIIi(di), theil; eDj il; -»,
inefficiencyfrom strategic underinvestment appears.
(b) IIj ( dj ) > IIj ( d;* )
IIi(d;) < IIi(di**)
for the first mover and
for the secondmover
The first mover can commit himself to a cost level that induces the
follower to cover the mass user market. This strategy pays for the first
mover because he is willing to commithimselfto a small cost reduction of
~ to avoid covering the mass user market. The equilibrium is
( ar~~~ IIAdj ), di**). The inefficiency from strategic investment occurs if
d~ ;t: arz max Il.(d.).
J iljeDi J J
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Chapter 3
R&Din the Presence of
Network Externalities:
Timing and Compatibility
Abstract
Two rival firms must decide when to invest in R&D and whether the new
products should be compatible. I show that network externalities may induce
the firms to advance their introduction of new incompatible technologies.
Early introduction of a new technology is socially harmful, because the R&D
costs increase, and de facto standardisation becomes less likely. Compared
with the equilibrium outcome, both firms may gain by delaying their
introduction of incompatible technologies. By agreeing on common standards
before product introduction, entry is delayed and the profit may increase. An
ex post optimal standardisation policy may increase the incentives for early
product introduction, and consequently be a undesirable policy ex ante.
JEL classification: 031, L13, L40.
*1 am grateful for valuable comments from Geir B. Asheim, Lars Sørgard, Marcel Thum,
and Tørres Trovik. This research has been financed by Telenor and the Foundation for
Research in Economics and Business Administration.
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1. Introduction
This paper discusses how network externalities influence R&D in an
emerging market where two prospective technologies will compete.l The
main issues are: the timing. of-R&Dinvestments, the incentives for achieving
compatibility by de facto standardisation or by voluntary agreements
between competing firms, and the impact of different public policy
instruments.
Rapid technological progress is observed in many industries with
network externalities. New technologies enable rivalling firms to introduce
new products like interactive TV, video-CDs, and digital imaging. In emerging
markets, extensive investments in R&D are usually needed to establish new
standards or dominant designs. Firms like Microsoft and Intel have shown
that the control of proprietary standards can be very valuable.
These features are captured in a model where the buyers enter
sequentially, and two firms decide simultaneously the speed of their R&D
projects. The outcome of an R&D project is uncertain, and it is more costly to
complete a given R&D project early than late. None of the firms have a
technology initially, and a buyer adopts a technology only once. An important
feature is that early introduction of a new technology does not restrict the
other firm's possibilities ofintroducing a different but competing technology
later.f
From a welfare perspective, the extra costs of an early introduction of
a new technology are, in the model, assumed to exceed possible benefits. I
lThe extra willingness to pay for compatible or standardised products is often referred to
as a network externality.
2Mansfield (1986) and Levin et al. (1987) find evidence of limited effectiveness of patents,
because competitors legally "invent around" patents. See also the literature on capital-
embodied innovations, e.g. Reinganum (1981), Riordan (1992), and Katz and Shapiro
(1992).
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show that, without network externalities, the firms will choose the socially
optimal R&D strategy and introduce a new technology late. However, this
may not be the outcome in a market with network externalities. Network
externalities make it valuable to have an installed base facing an entrant.
Consequently, a firmmay find it. profitable to enter early to establish an
installed base before facing competition.
The question of when to develop a new technology is also studied in the
literature about preemptive technology adoption.f Here, the argument for
early introduction relies on the assumption that this prevents or delays
competitors' development of competing technologies.s Contrary to the
literature cited, I find that network externalities may induce firms to develop
a new technology early, even when the competitors' R&D efforts are fixed.
I show that network externalities may induce both firms to introduce
new technologies early, even though they might be better off by mutually
delaying entry. If the firms anticipate that incompatibility will induce them to
engage in a costly R&D race, they would be better off by agreeing on common
standards and design features before the product is ready for the market,
thus removing the racing incentives. Common design standards enable a
buyer to take advantage of the complementary products initially offered to
the competing technology. Thus, the firms' incentives to enter early to obtain
an installed base are removed.
The above result suggest that one of the motives for the growing
number of alliances in the information technology industries might be to
3See e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Gilbert and Newbery (1982), and Riordan (1992).
4Fudenberg and Tirole (1985): "(1fJ firms can observe and respond to their rivals' actions,
firms have an incentive for "preemptive adoption". By this we mean that firms will adopt
sooner than they would choose to were their rivals' adoption dates fixed."
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determine common design features in emerging markets.f Compatibility
weakens the advantage of incumbency and reduces the pace of the R&D
race.
Given that the two competing firms do not agree on compatibility, how
should a welfaremaximising government act? The late entering buyers may
prefer a technology which is incompatible with the technology already
adopted by the first buyers. The new buyers take into account only their own,
and not the previous buyers' loss of network externalities. If the new
incompatible technology does not constitute a technological improvement
large enough to justify both the previous and the new buyers' loss of network
externalities, it might be tempting for a government agency to prevent a
switch of standards.
However, I show that if the first buyers anticipate that the
government may act in favour of the established technology, they become
more willing to buy that technology at their time of entry. Consequently, such
a standardisation policy may induce the firms to advance their development
of new technologies. One of the results in this paper is that a public policy
which at a first glance seems to be beneficial, may be socially harmful when
one takes the firms' R&D decisions into account. I show that compulsory
licensing can reduce the advantage of entering first and may, consequently,
be an advantageous public policy.
Furthermore, if a government agency cannot renounce its power to
introduce mandatory standards later, it may face a dynamic inconsistency
problem: the firms make their development decisions before the agency can
decide on a standardisation policy. Thus, the firms know that the best public
policy, given the firms' introduction dates, may include mandatory standards.
5Katz and Ordover (1990) points out that the telecommunication, computer, and
semiconductor industries have a large share of the total number of cooperative R&D
agreements registered under The National CooperativeResearch Act of 1984.
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Hence, without commitment to a standardisation policy before the firms
choose their R&D strategies, the government's authority to impose
mandatory standards at a later date, may induce the firms to engage in a
sociallyharmful R&Drace.
In the previous studies of network externalities and the adoption or
innovation ofnew technologies,it has been assumed that the entry date of at
least one oftwo competingtechnologiesis fixed.Consequently, strategic R&D
competition between firms in a new market, which is the main topic of this
paper, is ignored. Katz and Shapiro (1992) discusses the impact network
externalities may have on the entry date of the second technology in the
market. Choi (1994) discusses the first buyers' incentives to adopt a new
technologybefore information about alternative technologiesis revealed. His
paper discusses the buyers' actions, rather than focusing on strategic
interaction between competingfirms, which is one ofthe main topics here.
The paper is organised as follows:in section 2, the model is outlined.
Section 3 characterises the equilibrium strategies and section 4 focuses on
the impact different assumptions about buyers' expectations can have on
the equilibrium outcome. Section 5 draws implications for public policy.
Before the conclusion of the paper, the firms' incentives to agree on
compatibility before the new products are ready for market introduction are
discussed (section 6).
2. The basic model
The game has three stages. At stage 1, two firms, firm A and firm B, decide
simultaneously for which stage a new technology should be developed and
offered. The two technologies are incompatible. At the followingtwo stages,
two buyers enter sequentially. That is, the first buyer considers the potential
technologies at stage 2 and decides whether to adopt or wait until stage 3.
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The second buyer considers the technologies offered at stage 3, and adopts
one of the technologies. Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of the basic
three stage game.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Firms A and B choose The firms in the The firms set prices.
to develop a new - market set prices. - The second buyer (and
technology for stage The first buyer adopts the first if she has
2 or 3. a technology or waits. waited) adopts a
technology.
Figure 1. R&D timing in a three stage game
A. The buyers
The buyers are assumed to have identical preferences over alternative
technologies.The adoptionofa technologyis irreversible.
Abuyer's value of a technology consists of two components. One is the
value of the product, given that the other buyer does not buy the same or a
compatible technology,referred to as the stand-alone value. The secondis the
network externalities which only incur if the buyers use compatible
technologies.Let A denote the value of the network externality, and let a or b
denote the stand-alone value, depending on whether the product is produced
by firm A or firm B, respectively.
Given that both buyers adopt at stage 3, for some prices there will be
multiple equilibria. Similar to the approach taken by Katz and Shapiro
(1986), I assume that the adoption decisions are made as if consumers could
coordinate their adoption. That is, if there are multiple equilibria, then a
Pareto optimal equilibrium is assumed to be realised.
To focus on the impact from network externalities on R&D, it is
assumed that, ceteris paribus, the first buyer is indifferent between buying a
given technologyat stage 2 or at stage 3. Furthermore, I ignore discounting of
prospective consumer surplus and profit. Discounting will introduce well-
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known incentives for early introduction of new technologies that are
unrelated to the incentives due to network externalities. Relaxing these two
assumptions would complicate the modelwithout yielding substantially new
insights.
B. Thefirms
Firms A and B are assumed to be identical ex ante. It is assumed to costmore
to have a technology ready for introduction at stage 2 than at stage 3 (see
Scherer (1967)). Let both firms have the same extra R&D costs if they
develop a new technology for stage 2. Denote the extra costs C. For
simplicity, there are no R&Dcosts if the firms enter at stage 3. The outcome
or stand-alone value of an R&Dproject is stochastic. Assume that the firms'
R&D projects result in stand-alone values which are non-negative real
numbers with commonsupport, [0,v]. The probability distribution is given by
G(·). The firms are assumed to be equally capable of developing a new
technologyand, consequently, the stand-alone values, a and b, have identical
probability distributions.
If a firm introduces a new technology at stage 2, it does not develop
another technology for stage 3.6 It is often difficult to improve the existing
technology or standard, while at the same time maintaining compatibility
with the version ownedby the existing users. Hence, this assumption is more
likely to apply to markets where network externalities are present than to
other markets (see Katz and Shapiro (1992)).7
The production costs are ignored for simplicity; the stand-alone values,
a and b, should be interpreted as the net valuation of the new products. The
firms engage in price competition.
&rhis is a common assumption in the literature concerning capital-embodied innovations,
see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985),Reinganum (1981), and Riordan (1992).
7By introducing a new incompatible technology, the incumbent gives up a competitive
advantage.
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3. Incompatibility and timing of entry
I examine the sub-game perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) in pure strategies.
First, the equilibrium outcomes inthe possible sub-games starting with stage
2 are examined. Then focus is on the firms' decisions at stage 1.Knowing the
expected equilibrium profits in the different sub-games, the firms decide at
stage 1 for which stage they will develop a new technology. There are four
sub-games to consider: both firms enter at stage 2, both enter at stage 3, and
the firms enter sequentially.
The expected profit in the sub-game where both firms enter at stage 3,
will serve as a benchmark when the profit in the other three sub-games are
analysed. As no technology is offered until stage 3, none of the firms obtain
an installed base advantage before facing the buyers. The expected profits in
the three other sub-games will differ from this benchmark by the follower's
loss, F(A), the leader's benefits, L(A), or by the mutual benefits given that
both firms offer a technology at stage 2, M(A). In the two last sub-games
there is also a cost associated with rapid development.
Let n{i,j), i.j e {2,3}, denote a firm's expected profit given that it
chooses to introduce its new technology at stage i and that the competitor
introduces its technology at stage j. Furthermore, let Pi and qi' i = 2,3,
respectively be firm A and firm B's price at stage i. In the following,I analyse
the profit in the four different sub-games.
The expected profit if both firms introduce a technology at stage 3, n(3, 3),'
In this sub-game the firm with the best technology, i.e., the technology with
the highest stand-alone value (a or b), will maximise its profit by offering the
same consumer surplus as the largest consumer surplus the competitor can
offer without a loss. Thus, if firm A (B) has the best technology, the market
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pricewill be a - b (b - a). The firms' expectedprofits are equal, because they
ex ante have identical chances to develop the best technology. A firm's
expectedprofit is equal to the number ofbuyers times the expecteddifference
between its own stand-alone value and the competitor's stand-alone value,
given that it has the best technology. Each firm's expected profit can be
calculated as
ii a v
O( 3,3) = 2f f (a - b )dG( b )dG( a) = 2f G(a)( 1- G(a) )da.
o o o
(1)
Here we let b take values below a for everypossiblerealisation of a. The last
equality followsby integration by parts. Note that there are two buyers at
stage 3.
The expected profit ifboth firms introduce a technology at stage 2, 0(2,2):
Here, we calculate the firms' mutual benefits if they both develop new
technologies for stage 2, M(L\). Ex ante, both firms have the possibility of
capturing the buyers sequentially, and establishing an installed base for
stage 3.
To calculate the ex post profit, the competition at stage 3 is analysed
before the competition at stage 2.Without loss ofgenerality, suppose firm A
has the best technology,i.e., a ~ b. At stage 3, the firm that has captured the
first buyer has an installed base advantage. There are two cases. The
installed base advantage, L\, may but must not exceed the difference in
stand-alone values, a - b .
First consider the case where the difference in stand-alone values
exceeds a possible installed base advantage, i.e., a - b ~ L\. Here, the second
buyer-adopts firm A's technology even if firm B has an installed base. The
first buyer considers two alternatives. She can buy firm A's product at stage
2 and get a net benefit of a+L\- P2• The benefits include the network
externalities because firm A captures the last buyer. Alternatively, she can
-77- fMnlnlll No Bm ..... ,..l1'jIIj.Dj BINI .
wait and get a net benefit of b+~, which is the largest net benefit the loser at
stage 3 (firm B) can profitably offer. Hence, firm A captures the first buyer
by setting P2 = a-b. Then, having obtained the installed base advantage,
firm A also captures the second buyer by setting P3 = a +~ - b. 80, firm A
earns a profit of 2(a....,. b) +~, given the stand-alone values, without taking into
account the extra R&D cost, C, caused by entry at stage 2 instead of at
stage 3.
Let a - b < ~. In this case, obtaining an installed base advantage is
crucial for capturing the second buyer: The firm that captures the 'first buyer
will also capture the second buyer. By capturing the first buyer, the sum of
the firms' profit at stage 2 and 3 is, respectively, P2 + a +~ - band
% + b+ ~ - a, for firm A and firm B. The lowest price that firm A can
profitably offer is b - a - ~, and the lowest price that firm B can profitably
offer is a - b - ~. Given that a > b, firm A is able to offer larger net consumer
benefits than firm B. Firm A earns a profit of
(a+~-(b+~-(a-b-~»+a+~-b=3(a-b), given the stand-alone values,
and excluding the extra R&D cost caused by rapid development of the new
technology.
80 far, the ex post profit has been analysed for the firm with the
highest stand-alone value. At stage 1, however, the two firms do not know
their future stand-alone values. They will base their decisions on the
conditional expectation, which is identical for the firms:
11(2,2l; H!2(a-b)dG(bl+ TMG(bl+ J~a -bldG(bl}dG(al - C
= n(3,3) +M(~) - C (2)
where
M(~l:;ICr..dG(bl+ .l~a-bldG(bl}G(al. (3)
M(~) can be interpreted as the benefit of entering at stage 2 instead of at
stage 3. The first integral in the brackets represents the benefits of early
entry in the cases where a - b ~ Il, and the second integral represents the
benefits ofearly entry if a - b < Il.
We see that without taking into account the extra costs, it is an
advantage to capture the buyers sequentially, compared with facing all the
customers simultaneously. Given an early entry, the first buyer and the firms
can share the benefits of being able to expropriate the second buyer's benefit of
the network externality.
The expected profit of the firm entering first, TI(2,3):
Here, we calculate the benefits of developing a technology before the
competitor, L(Il). The firm introducing a new technology at stage 2 may
establish an installed base before the competingfirm enters.
Without loss of generality, suppose that firm A enters first. The first
buyer cannot at stage 2 know the stand-alone value of the technology
entering at stage 3. She will compare the expected net benefits of buying
immediately with the expected benefits of waiting until the second firm
enters.
L Buying firm A's technologyimmediately: a+ IlG( a + Il) - P2
n. Waiting until the secondfirm enters:
a v
Il+ fbdG(b)+ f adG(b)
O a
If the buyer adopts firm A's technology at stage 2, she will only obtain the
compatibility benefits if the technology firm B introduces at stage 3 has a
stand-alone value less than a + Il. The probability ofthis outcomeis G(a + Il).
Suppose the buyer waits until stage 3, then, given that firm A has the best
technology, she will chooseaccordingly, and obtain net benefits equal to the
a
expected stand-alone value offirm B' technology, f bdG(b). I~firm B has the
o v
best technology,she obtains the stand-alone value offirm A, f adG(b).
a
For firm A to find it profitable to capture the first buyer at stage 2, its
technology, a, must exceeda certain level a. This is so, because given that a
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is small, the first buyer will find it likely that the later buyer will buy firm B's
technology at stage 3. Hence, the buyer will pay less as potential network
externalities are lost. The price when a;::: a is given by
a v
P2 = f (a - b )dG( b) - f MG( b).
o a+1I.
The last term represents the buyer's expected loss of network externalities.
Seen from stage 2, firm A's total profit is P2 plus the expected profit ofhaving
an installed base when facing the second buyer at stage 3:
~II. a ~II. v
P2 + f(a+A-b)dG(b)= f(a-b)dG(b)+ f(a+A-b)dG(b)- fAdG(b) (4)
O O O a+1I.
The cut-off value, a, is determined such that the profit if the first buyer is
captured at stage 2, equals the profit when the technology is not adopted at
stage 2. Hence, a, is given by the following equation:
li li li+1I. v
2f(a-b)dG(b)= f(a-b)dG(b)+ f(a+A-b)dG(b)- fMG(b)
o o o li+1I.
or
li li+1I. v
f AdG( b) + f (a +A - b )dG( b) - f AdG( b) = O.
o li li+1I.
(5)
The first two integrals represent the expected price increase by having an
installed base facing the second buyer. The third integral represents the first
buyer's expected loss ofnetwork externalities if she adopts a new technology
at stage 2. The expected loss of network externalities reduces the first
buyer's willingness to pay for the technology at stage 2. Consequently, it
represents a loss ofprofit for the firm. Given that firm A's stand-alone value
is a, the loss and the gain of capturing the first buyer at stage 2 are equal.
The ex ante expected profit, not knowing whether a is smaller or larger
than a, is:
lia
II(2,3) = 2ff (a - b )dG(b )dG(a)
o o
+J(j (a - b)dG(b)+ aj(a +A -b)dG(b)- JAdG(b))~G(a)- C
li o o a+1I. (6)
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The first term represents the expected profit if the first firm's stand-alone
value is nøt sufficiently large to capture the first buyer at stage 2, i.e., a < a.
The second term represents the profit ifthe stand-alone value is large enough
to induce the first firm to capture the first buyer at stage 2, i.e., a ~ a. The
profit, n(2,3), can be written as
n(2,3) = n(3,3)+ L(A) - C
where L(A) represents the leader's benefits:
L(a):= mMG(b)+ "[<o+a-bldG(b)-.!.MG(b)}G(O).
Interpretation is similar as for (5). It follows from the definition of a that
L(A) is positive.
The expected profit of the firm entering last, n(3,2):
It remains to study the loss for the firm developing a technology for stage 3
given that the competitor offers a technology at stage 2, F(A).
If a e [li, v], firm A (which is assumed to enter first) captures the buyer
entering at stage 2 immediately. In this case, the demand at stage 3 does
only include the demand of the second buyer. However, if a e [o.a), firm A
does not capture the first buyer at stage 2. Consequently, the demand at
stage 3 includes the first buyer's demand. The profit of the firm entering last
is
ti v li v
n(3,2) = 2J J (b -a)dG(b)dG(a) + J J (b- (a + A»dG(b)dG(a)
o a il a+LI.
= n(3,3) - F(A) (7)
where
F(a ):=lvr (b - o)dG(b)+.!.(b - o)dG(b) + .l;tG(b l}aG( o).
F(A) is the expected loss ofbeing the second firm compared with the outcome
where both firms enter at stage 3. The first integral in the brackets
represents the loss of not serving both buyers in the case where firm B would
have won if firm A had waited until stage 3 to introduce its new technology,
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i.e., a+ Il> b > a. The second integral represents the loss caused by reduced
demand in the cases where firm A captures the first buyer and firm B
captures the second. Firm B's installed base disadvantage is represented by
the third integral.
A. Equilibrium outcomes
Having analysed the sub-games starting with stage 2, I now turn to stage 1.
At stage 1, the two firms compare the expected profit levels calculated above
and choose whether to develop the new technology for stage 2 or 3. See Figure
2.
FirmB
FirmA
2 3
0(2,2) 0(2,3)
2
0(2,2) 0(3,2)
0(3,2) 0(3,3)
3
0(2,3) 0(3,3)
Figure2. Stage 1
The timing of entry depends on the comparison of different profit levels. Since
I have assumed that the firms have identical distributions over stand-alone
values and the same development costs, we only have to compare 0(2,2)
with 0(3,2) and 0(2,3) with 0(3,3) to find the equilibrium outcome. Given
that the competitor enters at stage 2, a firm enters at stage 2 if, and only if,
0(2,2) ~ 0(3,2) or M(Il) + F(Il) ~ C. Moreover, given that the competitor
enters at stage 3, the firm enters at stage 2 if, and only if, 0(2,3) ~ 0(3,3) or
L(Il)~ C.
It is straightforward to prove the different equilibrium outcomes
summarised in Table 1:
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Il(2,2) Il (3,2) Il(2,3) Il(3,3) Equilibrium outcomes
M(å)+ F(A) C L(Å) C
> > (2,2).
> < (2,2), (3,3).
< > (2,3), (3,2).
< < (3,3).
Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes
In the right column, firm A's date of entry is stated first and firm B's entry
date second, e.g. (3,2) means that firm A enters at stage 3 and firm B at
stage 2.
There are assumed to be no social benefits from developing a
technology for stage 2 instead of for stage 3 - the gross benefits of adopting a
technology at stage 2 and at stage 3 are the same. However, there are two
possible welfare losses associated with early introduction of a new
technology. In addition to increasing the R&D costs, sequential entry may
lead to loss of standardisation benefits. Given that the first buyer adopts the
technology offered at stage 2, the standardisation benefits are lost if the
technology developed last turns out to be a favourable choice of the second
buyer. Hence, the socially best outcome is that both firms introduce their
technologies at stage 3.
In the absence ofnetwork externalities (å =O),a firm will not benefit
from early entry (stage 2) - there are no benefits attributed to establishing
an installed base before the second firm's entry, i.e., M(O) =O, F(O) =O,and
L(O) = 0.8 However, if a firm enters early, the R&D costs increase by C> O.
Consequently, in the absence ofnetwork externalities, both firms will enter at
Brrheequalities follow from the definitions of M(Å), F(Å), and L(Å).
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stage 3, and the equilibrium outcome coincides with the socially best
outcome.
Proposition 1
Mutual entry of the firms at stage 3 is the socially best outcome. In equilibrium,
network externalities may induce one or both firms to enter at stage 2.
The formal proofis straightforward and hence omitted.?
Corollary 1
Increased networkexternalities, il, increase the gain of being first, L(il), the
loss ofbeing last, F(il), and thegain ofmutually entering early, M(il).
To induce the firms to enter at stage 3, the extra cost attributed to early entry, C,
needs to be larger if the network externalities increase.
Proof:See the Appendix.
There are two reasons why an increase in network externalities will increase
the firms' advantage of entering first and the disadvantage of entering
second. First, the total value of the incumbent technology increases
compared to the entrant's technology. Second, given an increase in the
network externalities, the firm whichenters first will be more inclined (i.e., for
lower stand-alone values) to capture the first buyer. Consequently, the loss of
being second increases. However, an increase in the network externalities
has a negative impact on the first firm's profit as well. Knowing that the
second buyer may choosean incompatible technology, the first buyer will be
9Given that the R&Dproject that leads to a new technology at stage 2 is equally costlyas
the project that ends at stage 3, and that the first project dominates the second by first
order stochastic dominance, network externalities may still cause premature entry.
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more reluctant to buy the first introduced technology (due to increased value
of compatibility). Consequently, the first buyer is willing to pay less, and the
profit is reduced. The proof of Corollary 1 shows that the positive impact of
larger network externalities exceedsthe negative impact on profit.
Compared with entering at stage 3, the firms' extra profits byentering
mutually at stage 2, M(A), grow with an increase in the network
externalities. At stage 3, larger network externalities increase the expected
difference between the best offers the firms can profitably make. The firm
with an installed base will be in a more advantageous position and earn more
due to the increase in the value of the installed base. Since the two firms are
identical ex ante, they have equal opportunities ofbecoming the firm with the
installed base advantage. Hence, both firms' expected profits increase with
an increase in the network externalities. Moreover, since it becomes more
profitable to possess an installed base at stage 3, the competition at stage 2
will becomemore vigorous. However, the proof ofCorollary 1 shows that the
increase in the expected profit at stage 3 exceeds the loss due to tougher
competition at stage 2.
Proposition 2
Given M(A) + F(A) > C> M(A), mutual entry at stage 2 is an equilibrium
outcome although both firms get a larger profit if they mutually enter at stage
3. If, in addition, L(A) > C, mutual entry at stage 2 is a unique equilibrium.
Proof: From Table 1, M(A)+ F(A) > C ensures that (2,2) is an equilibrium.
L(A) > C ensures that (2,2)is a unique equilibrium. Given C> M(A), the fixed
R&D costs attributed to rapid development of a new technology exceed the
firms' benefits byentering at stage 2 instead of at stage 3.
Q.E.D.
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Although both firms in equilibrium enter at stage 2, they might have earned
more if they mutually delayed entry until stage 3. By developing the new
technology more slowly, R&D costs are saved, and this cost reduction can
exceed the benefits of entering at stage 2.
Given that the conditions stated in Proposition 3 hold, due to the
network externalities both firms will enter the market at stage 2, although
mutual entry at stage 3 is Pareto preferred.t? In the cases where (2,2) is a
unique equilibrium, the firms are facing a game that resembles the well-
known prisoners' dilemma game. In a market without network externalities,
these incentives for entering early disappear and the firms' profits are larger.
B. Consumer surplus
Early introduction of new technologies may have different consequences for
the first and the second buyer.
Denote the buyer entering at stage k's consumer surplus csk(i,j), given
that the two firms enter at stages i and}, i.j.k E {2,3}.11
Proposition 3
The first buyer:
CS2 (2,2) > cS2 (3,3) = cS2 (3,2).
The second buyer:
cs3(3,3) ~ cs3(2,3) > cs3(2,2).
Proof: See the Appendix.
l<>Thewell being of the buyers is not taken into account.
lIThe consumer surplus is independent of which firm that enters first,
csk(2,3) = csk(3,2).
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The first buyer benefits from an early entry of both firms. Both firms are
willing to take a loss at stage 2 to be able to profit from an installed base
advantage at stage 3. The competition for the first buyer will be tougher the
more equally valuable the two technologies are. If a firm fmds it necessary to
capture the first buyer to be able to profitably capture the second, i.e.,
la - bl < A, it will be willing to set the price below production costs. In the cases
where the difference in the stand-alone values is sufficiently large to let a firm
capture the last buyer independent of whether it has captured the first,
la - bl ~ A, the first buyer will be offered the consumer surplus which the
losing firm at most can offer profitably. For a given stand-alone value offirm
A, the consumer surplus of the first buyer is illustrated in Figure 3.
a+2A
/~-,
••1·- .
l .
l·· ...
/ ..... a+A, ...
l /----4-----
/ / .
l ///v.
~-----a-_~A----------~----------~bO Ll a a+A
: The first buyer's surplus. given that the firms
enter jointly at stage 3 or sequentially.
: The first buyer's surplus. given that the firms
enter jointly at stage 2.
Figure3. The first buyer's consumer surplus
The firms' entry decision will have a different impact on the second buyer's
surplus than on the first buyer's surplus. The second buyer prefers that none
of the firms have established an installed base before the second buyer
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arrives, and consequently that both firms enter at stage 3. Without an
installed base, the competition is expected to be more vigorous because the
firms are equally good competitors. Keeping firm A's stand-alone value fixed,
the second buyer's surplus is illustrated in Figure 4.
a+~
.../........, .......... a""......_--------
"'"""""""""""""b",,""
""""""~--------------------------------~bO a
: The second buyer's surplus, given that both firms
enter at stage 3 or that the first entering firm does
not capture the first buyer at stage 2.
: The second buyer's consumer surplus, given that
the firms enter sequentially and the first firm
captures the first buyer.
- - - - -, : The second buyer's consumer surplus, given that
both firms enter at stage 2.
Figure4. The second buyer's consumer surplus
It is worth noting that the two buyers have conflicting interests regarding the
pace of the product development. The first buyer favours that both firms
enter early and engage in severe competition to capture the first buyer and
consequently obtain an installed base advantage. The second buyer prefers
that the competition at stage 3 is not curbed by an installed base advantage.
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4.Expect~tions
In the above discussion there has been assumed to be only one buyer in each
generation or at each stage. Possible co-ordination problems within each
generation have, consequently, been ignored. Moreover, if the first buyer
waits until the secondbuyer enters, it has been assumed that the two buyers
co-ordinateon the Pareto preferred technology.
To focus on co-ordinationfailures within a generation ofbuyers, there
is in this section assumed to be n identical buyers in each generation. Three
alternative assumptions regarding the buyers' expectations about the other
buyers' choice, are discussed and compared with the situation where the
buyers co-ordinateon the Pareto preferred technology.
Alternative assumptions about the buyers' expectations:
1. Each generation co-ordinates on the Pareto optimal technology
alternative.
2. The first generation ofbuyers adopts the Pareto preferred technology
and the secondgeneration adopts the same technologygiven that it is
not a dominated strategy.
3. One ofthe technologiesis expectedto win throughout the game and will
be adopted ifit is not a dominated strategy.
Assumption 1 is similar to assuming that there is only one buyer in each
generation. The discussion based on this assumption serves as a benchmark
for the discussionofthe followingtwo assumptions.
If assumption 2 is adopted, it is a focal equilibrium for the second
generation of buyers to choose the same technology as the first buyers.t-
12See Schelling (1960).
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Hence, the second generation of buyers will not necessarily adopt the
technologywhichmaximises their consumer surplus.
Moreover, in some cases, one of the competitors may have a
reputation for being the firm which sets the standards in new markets. In
these markets, assumption 3 may reflect the buyers' expectations. For
instance, IBMpreviously benefited from having a reputation for being a, de
facto, standard-setter in the computer market.
The notation has to be changed slightly to capture that there are more
than onebuyer in each generation:
Network externalities given
n buyers in each generation:
Network externalities given
1 buyer in each generation:
Onebuyer: o o
Allbuyers in
one generation:
Both generations:
.1(n)
.1(2n)
o
The previous notation, where there is assumed to be only one buyer in
each generation, is summerized in the right-hand column. The left-hand
column contains the new notation with n buyers in each generation ofbuyers.
Given that the buyers' expectations are given by assumption i E [1,2,3],
let Mi(.1) be the benefits of a mutual entry at stage 2, Fi(.1) be the loss of
entering at stage 3 given that the competitor enters at stage 2, and £(.1) be
the gain ofentering at stage 2 ifthe competitor enters at stage 3.
Proposition 4
If the buyers' expectations are given by assumption 2 instead of assumption 1,,
a firm's incentives to enter at stage 2 increase whether the competitor enters at
stage 2 or at stage 3 (i.e. L2(.1) > £(.1) and M2(.1) + F2(.1) > MI(.1) + Fl (.1)).
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Proof:See the Appendix.
The main differencebetween assumptions 1 and 2 is that, if assumption 2 is
adopted, the first generation's choice represents a signal to the next
generation of buyers. The buyers in the second generation expect that the
other buyers in her generation will adopt the same technology as the first
buyers did, given that this technology is not a dominated choice.
Consequently, selling to the second generation ofbuyers, the firm with the
installed base is not only able to profit from the network externalities of the
existing installed base, but also from the expected network externalities of
the secondgeneration.
It follows from Table 1 that if assumption 2 is adopted instead of
assumption 1, the increase in R&D costs by early entry has to be larger to
prevent a firm fromentering early.
Even though none of the competing firms have a history in the
emerging market, a firm can benefit from its reputation in an established
market. A firm which is the dominating firm in other markets might be
expected to also dominate a new market. Take Microsoft as an example. If
Microsoft enters the interactive television market, the buyers may expect
that its dominating positionin the softwareindustry will be transferred to the
new market, and that its technologywill be the dominating standard in the
new market as well. In these cases, assumption 3 seems to be the best one.
If the buyers' expectations are given by assumption 3, the two firms
will have different profit opportunities. Without loss ofgenerality, let firm A
have the technologywhich the buyers anticipate will be adopted as a market
standard.
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Proposition 5
Given that the buyers' expectations are given by assumption 3,
a. the firm having the technology expected to become the market standard
will never benefit from entering beforethe other firm.
b. the firms will never enter sequentially.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The firm which is anticipated by the buyers to set the market standard, will
not benefit from introducing its technology before its competitor. An early
entry will only be profitable if it enables the firm to set a higher price facing
thesecond generation of buyers. However, since the second generation of
buyers expects that the dominating firm's technology will be the standard,
independent ofwhether it enters early or not, the second generation ofbuyers'
willingness to pay is independent of the timing of entry.
However, the firm which is not expected to set the market standard,
may prefer to introduce its technology at stage 2. Byentering early, it can
capture the buyers sequentially. At stage 3, an installed base enables the
firm to set a higher price to the second generation of buyers and still offer a
product-price combination which dominates the best offer the competitor
profitably can make.P
If the firm which is expected to set the market standard knows that its
competitor enters at stage 2, it may decide to enter early as well. Byentering
early, the firm can prevent the competitor from establishing an installed
base before facing competition, and hence reduce the competitor's advantage
ofhaving a reputation for being a standard setter in new markets. It is shown
that the anticipated standard-setter's loss of entering after the other firm,
13Although a buyer expects that the others adopt the incompatible technology, she will
stick to the same technology.
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exceeds the competitor's benefits of entering first. Since the extra R&Dcosts
of entering early are the same for the two firms, both firms enter early if the
firm which is not the anticipated standard-setter finds it profitable to enter
early.
In the followingsections, I shall for simplicity return to the two-buyer
assumption - there is only onebuyer in each generation and co-ordination on
the Pareto optimal equilibrium is achieved.However,it is shown above that if
the buyers' expectations are not given by assumption 1, but by assumption
2, this will essentially increase the value of having an installed base.
Consequently, in the following discussion we can infer that if the buyers'
expectations are given by assumption 2 instead ofby assumption 1, this will
haye the same impacts on the market outcome as an increase in the
network externalities.
5. Public policy
Much of the research on network externalities and co-ordination problems
has suggested that intervention of a government agency can solve the
externality problem. Government agencies are to some extent aware of the
need for standardisation in many markets, and have supported voluntary
standardisation organisations as well as established agencies which hold the
authority to impose mandatory standards, e.g. Federal Communication
Commissionin the US.
Assume that a government imposes mandatory standards if
standardisation improves social welfare, but that it cannot regulate the
firms' R&Defforts. Consequently, the timing ofentry is chosenby the firms.
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Proposition 6
Suppose that the government chooses the incumbent technology as a mandatory
standard whenever the market outcome implies a welfare reducing switch of
standards. The firms' incentives to enter at stage 2 are strengthened even if the
introduction of a mandatory standard is followed up by regulation to prevent
the incumbent firm from charging a price above the production. costs.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Although the technological improvement is too small to justify a switch of
standards, the second buyer may favour the new technology instead of the
incumbent one (i.e. 2~ > la - bl > ~). In these situations a benevolent
government has incentives to impose the established technology as a
mandatory standard for both buyers. The socially best standardisation policy
when the introduction dates of the technologies are given, we refer to as the
ex post efficient policy. However, if the buyers' adoption dates as well as the
firms' entry dates are not given, the suggested standardisation policy can
harm social welfare. An ex ante efficient standardisation policy might be
different from an expost efficient standardisation policy.
The first buyer's incentive to adopt the firstly introduced technology
immediately, is strengthened by an ex post efficient public standardisation
policy. The probability of buying a technology which is compatible with the
next buyer's technology, increases if the government can intervene at stage
3. Consequently, the probability of a loss of network externalities is reduced,
and the first buyer is less reluctant to adopt a new technology early. The firm
entering first demands a lower stand-alone value to capture the first buyer
(i.e., li is lower). Moreover, since early adoption makes incompatibility with
the buyer entering last possible, an ex post efficient standardisation policy
-94-
can be socially harmful. See Choi (1994) for a discussion of a similar result in
a different model.
Besides strengthening the first buyer's incentives for adoption at stage
2, the ex post efficient public standardisation policy may also influence the
firms' timing of R&D. Let L'(A) and F (A), respectively, denote the first
firm's gain byentering early and the last firm's loss of being second, given
that the government agency follows the ex post efficient standardisation
policy. The first buyer's increased willingness to adopt a new technology at
stage 2 increases the profit of entering at stage 2 instead of at stage 3, i.e.,
L' (A) > L(A) and F (A) > F(A).14 Figure 5 illustrates how the timing ofproduct
introduction changes, due to expost efficient standardisation policy.
c
1
1
{(2,2), (3,3)} -> : ({3,3)} ->
{(2,2), (3,3)} 1 ({2,2), (3,3)}
1
1
1
: {(3,3)}->
1 {{3,3)}
1
L'(A)
1 1
- - - - - - - - - -1- - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - ,
I I
1
I
{(2,2), (3,3)} ->: {(3,3)} ->
{(2,2)} : {{2,2)}
1
I
I
I {{3,3)} ->
: {{2,3), (3,2)}
{{2,2)}->
{{2,~)}
1 1---------~----------1----------'
1
I
1 I
: {{2,2), (3,3)} ->: {(2,3), (3,2)} ->
1 {{2,2)} 1 {{2,3), (3,2)}
I
I
1
L(A)
0,0 M(A)+ F(A) M(A)+ F (A) c
{the equilibrium outcomes without expost standardisation policy}->
{the equilibrium outcomes with expost standardisation policy}
Figure5. Standardisation policy and timing of entry and R&D
14See the proof of Proposition 6.
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In cases where the timing of R&D alters due to the ex post efficient
standardisation policy, the social welfare is never improved, but may be
reduced. We can conclude that ex post efficient standardisation policymay be
harmful, given that the government cannot regulate the firms' R&D.
Although-the government knows that mandatory standards at stage 3
reduce welfare, it might find it impossible to commit itself to abstain from
imposing standards at the time when the firms' R&Dand entry decisions are
made. If the firms make their R&Ddecisions before the government decides
whether to introduce mandatory standards, they expect the government to
introduce mandatory standards whenever it is welfare improving at the time
when the decision is made. Consequently, the government will take the firms'
R&D and entry decisions as given, and the ex post efficient standardisation
policy can be socially harmful, as discussed previously. The government has
to be able to commit itself to abstain from introducing mandatory standards
later, to prevent the socially harmful impact ex post standardisation policy
can have on the firms' R&Dand entry decisions.15
An alternative public policy is to impose compulsory licensing of the
best technology to the competing firm, for a license fee equal to or below the
fee the licenser is willing to accept in an unregulated market.lf
Proposition 7
The market outcome and the socially best outcome coincide if the government
requires that the firms license their technologies for a per-unit fee of
Max{la - bl,O}.
15The issue of dynamic inconsistency in public policy was first raised by Kydland and
Prescott (1977).
l&rhere is an existing literature on compulsory licensing, see e.g. Tandon (1982).
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Proof: If a firm enters at stage 2 and the competitor enters at stage 3, the
first firm will never capture the first buyer at stage 2 (see equation (5)).
a a~ ;
JOf(b)db+ J(ll+O-b)f(b)db- JAf(b)db=O~ll=v~ L(A)=O.
o a a~
Since the first entering firm never captures the first buyer at stage 2,
the second firm will never lose by ente ring at stage 3 instead of at stage 3,
i.e., F(A) = O.
Given that both firms enter at stage 2, the firm capturing the first
buyer will (due to the licensing regime imposed of the government) be unable
to take advantage ofits installed base at stage 3, i.e., M(A) =O. Proposition 7
follows. Q.E.D.
Above we have attributed the premature introduction of new technologies to
the presence of network externalities. The firm capturing the first buyer
obtains a strategic advantage at stage 3, which exceeds the difference in
stand-alone values of the two technologies. Requiring that the firm with the
best technology always licenses its technology for a per-unit fee equal to the
difference in stand-alone values, weakens the property rights of the best
technology. The firms cannot take advantage of the network externalities
and, consequently, there will be no gains byentering at stage 2, mutually or
alone. As in markets without network externalities, there will be no
incentives for entering early.l?
In some cases, the early buyers are concentrated in the firms' common
home market, and the late buyers are mainly in foreign markets. If a
government agency only takes into account the welfare of domestic buyers
and firms, it may, contrary to the discussion above, prefer that one or both
firms enter early. It follows from the discussion of consumer surplus, that
17Note that the government must be committed to enforce the licensing rule also if, given
the stand-alone values, the unregulated market outcome does not involve a socialloss.
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early introduction of one or both technologies reduces the consumer surplus
of the late buyers to the advantage of the finnes) and buyers entering early.
6. Compatibility
Although products are different, they may work together with identical
complementary goods, e.g. different computers can use the same software. In
these cases, we say that the products or technologies are compatible. To
achieve compatibility the firms have to agree on some common technological
features.
The industries such as the information technologies displayastriking
pattern of co-operative alliances.P The firms in these alliances both compete
and co-operate. As an example IBM and Apple have agreed upon the use of a
common CPU in their computers, but produce different computers which
compete in the market.
We have seen that network externalities create incentives for racing
into emerging markets. In this section, I argue that these racing incentives
can induce the firms to enter into alliances which seek to establish common
standards.
Assume that the firms by agreeing on certain common technological
features can ensure that prospective products are compatible. The firms'
compatibility decision is taken at stage O.See Figure 7.
If compatibility is agreed upon, the buyers can take advantage of the
complementary products supplied for a competing technology. Consequently,
the network externalities are not related to a particular technology, but can
be taken advantage of by users of competing technologies as well.l?
ISSee Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1992).
19The firms may at least reduce the difference in network externalities between the two
technologies by letting a large part of the complementary product be common for the two
technologies.
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·Stage ~ Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Firms A and B The firms choose Thefirms in the The firms set prices.
decide whether to develop a new market set prices. The second buyer
their technologies technology for The first buyer adopts (and the first if she
will be compatible stage 2 or 3. a technology or waits. has waited) adopts
or not a technology.
Figure 7. Compatibility and R&D
It has been argued that standardisation and compatibility stimulate R&D
and early development of new markets.s? Although there are good reasons to
believe that standardisation can stimulate innovation, standardisation may
as well induce the firms to spend less on R&D and early development of new
markets.
Proposition 8
If compatibility can be achieved without any costs, both firms will strictly
favour compatibility if
M(A)+ F(A) > C> M(A)
L(A» C.
and (8)
(9)
Compatibility delays the development of new technologies from stage 2 to stage
3.
Proof: Given that (8) and (9) hold, in equilibrium both firms enter at stage 2
(see Table 1). Since C >M( A), both firms prefer entry at stage 3 instead of at
stage 2.21 Q.E.D.
Network externalities may induce both firms to develop their technologies
early. This will happen if conditions (8) and (9) hold. Moreover, ifthe extra
20See e.g. David and SteinmuelIer (1994).
21Condition (9) is not necessary for having a mutual entry at stage 2 as an equilibrium,
but it makes sure that (2,2) is a unique equilibrium.
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R&D costs caused by an early introduction (C) exceed the benefits (M(A),
the firms have incentives to enter early, although they would have been
better off by mutually committing themselves to late entry. The situation
resembles the well-knownprisoners' dilemma game. (SeeProposition 2.)22
Compatibility will remove the advantage of having an installed base.
Consequently, the incentives for rapid development of a new technology
disappear and the pace of the R&D race is reduced.23Riordan (1992) also
points out the danger oftoo early development ofnew technologies.He shows
that price and entry regulations (as imposed on many cable and telephone
companies)can beneficiallyslowdown technologydevelopment. Here, I argue
that agreements about compatibility (or ex ante imposed standards) can
have a similar impact on the development ofnew technologies.
Although there has been extensive co-operation in high-technology
industries in recent years, and the co-operative agreements have often been
subject to scrutiny by Federal agencies, there has been little antitrust
enforcement. Given that some of the alliances are motivated by the need for
compatibility, the argument above can be used to justify a lenient antitrust
policy. The analysis of how mandatory standards can have adverse impacts
on welfare,might further strengthen the need for a lenient antitrust policy.24
221f compatibility can be achieved without the competing firm's consent, i.e., weak
intellectual property rights, none of the firms have incentives to obtain an installed base
byentering early. See Farrell (1989)for an interesting discussion on network externalities
and intellectual property rights.
23National Bureau of Standards refused to write interface standards for the computer
industry because they claimed standards would retard innovation. (See Hemenway (1975»
The analysis above can, to some extent, justify their claim that standards written before
development of new technologies (ex ante standardisation policy) discourage rapid
development ofnew technologies.However,note that slowdevelopment ofnew technologies
is desirable in my model..
24Note that mandatory standards imposed by government agencies taking the firms' entry
sequence as given, have a different impact on welfare than voluntary standards firms
agree on before the development ofnew products are completed.
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7. Conclusion and possible extensions
This paper has analysed how network externalities can influence the timing
of R&D. It is shown that network externalities give the firms incentives to
enter early in order to establish an installed base before the competitor
enters the market. Consequently, network externalities can induce the firms
to participate in an R&D race which increases the development costs of new
technologies, and may cause incompatibility between early and late adopters.
Compared with the equilibrium outcome, both firms may favour that
new technologies are developed less rapidly. The development costs decrease
if the firms have more time to search for a new technology. It is shown that
the firms, by agreeing on common features of prospective technologies which
ensure compatibility, can delay the development of new technologies.
Compatibility will remove the advantage of having an installed base and,
consequently, the firms will not have incentives to develop new technologies
quickly to capture buyers before the competitor enters. This may be one of
several reasons why we see so many co-operative arrangements in the
information technology industries.
In some cases, government agencies hold the authority to impose
mandatory standards. A welfare maximising government will want to impose
the incumbent technology as a mandatory standard, given that a new
incompatible technology will be adopted by the last entering buyers and that
it does not represent technological improvements sufficient to justify a
switch of standards. Since the first buyers anticipate that the government
may intervene in favour of the incumbent technology to ensure that network
externalities are not lost, the first buyers are more willing to buy early.
Consequently, the firms may be induced to enter early although accelerated
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entry reduces social welfare. Hence an ex post welfare optimal
standardisation policy can be disadvantageous ex ante.
The market outcome and the welfare optimaloutcome coincide if the
government agency requires that the firm with the best technology licenses
its technology fora reasonablelicense fee to the competitor. If the licensing
fee per-unit is set to the difference in stand-alone values between the two
competing technologies, the firms are unable to take advantage of an
installed base advantage, and the firms' incentives for premature entry are
removed.
There are several directions in which the analysis may be extended.
One could allow the firm not entering early to decide whether to develop a new
technology or not after the technology of the first entering firm is known.
Given that there are fixed costs attributed to late entry as well as to early
entry (e.g. R&D costs), the second firm will only enter ifthe expected income
of developing a new technology, given the established firm's technology,
exceeds the entry costs.
Another extension is to consider improvements of the first introduced
technology. Improvements of the first technology may make the first buyer
more reluctant to buy early because the expected consumer surplus of
waiting increases. However, an improvement will also reduce the probability
of a later switch of standards and, consequently, make early adoption more
attractive.
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Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1.
The corollary can be shown by differentiating L{d), F(d) and M(d) with
respect to d.
a) Differentiation of L(d):
dL(å) = aL(d) da + aL(d).
dÅ aa dÅ ad (Al)
aL(d) = o follows from the envelope theorem. Hence, the first term in (AI) isaa
zero. The second term is positive:
dL(å) = aL(d) = f(2G(a+d)+dg(a+d)-1)dG(a»0.
dÅ ad ii
g(.) is the density function of G(·). It follows from equation (5) that the
inequality holds:
ii+A
dG(a +d)+ J (a - b)dG(b) - d(l- G(a +d))= o
ii
1 ii+A
1-- J(a-b)dG(b)
G(a + d) = d ii > 0.5.
2
The advantage of being the leader increases with the amount of network
externalities.
b) Differentiation ofF(d):
dF(d) = aF(d) da + aF(d) .
dÅ aa dÅ ad
The first term is positive since aiad)< O and da < O. The first inequality is
a dÅ
obvious because the loss caused by being the follower is reduced if the first
firm requires a larger stand-alone value to capture the first buyer. The
second inequality can easily be established by differentiating (5) with respect
to a and d:
da = 1-a:~(a + d) - dg(a + d) < o.
dÅ JdG(b) + dg(a + d)
ii
Note that I have used that G(a + d) > 0.5.
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The second tenn is also positive:
aF(d) ii(ii 0+.1. J
--'---'-= J J dG(b) + (a + d - a - d)g(a + d) - J dG(b) dG(a) > O.
ad ti o o
An increase in the network externalities increases the loss ofbeing second.
c) Differentiation of M(d):
dM(d) ii
------>.-.<.. = JG( a - d )dG( a) >O.
d.D. o
The gains by mutually entering at stage 2 instead of at stage 3 grow with the
amount of network externalities. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Before the consumer surplus in the three different cases can be compared,
they have to be calculated:
a) The consumer surplus, given that both firms enter at stage 2:
The first buyer's expected consumer surplus:
cs,(2,2) =mbdG(b)+ JadG(b) }G(a)+ å+D!å -Ia- bJ)dG(b)dG(a).
The second buyer's expected consumer surplus:
cs3(2,2)= J{IbdG(b)+ JadG(b)}dG(a).
o o o
b) Consumer surplus, given that both firms enter at stage 3:
cs2(3,3) = cs3(3,3) = J(I bdG(b)+ JadG(b)]dG(a) +d.
o o o
c) Consumer surplus if the firms enter sequentially:
The first buyer will get the same consumer surplus whether she enters at
stage 2 or at stage 3:
cs2(2,3)= J(IbdG(b)+ JadG(b)]dG(a)+d.
o o o
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The second buyer's consumer surplus:
cs,(2,3) =HlbdG(b) + l adG(b)+A }dG( a)+ l n~dG(b) +J.adG(b) }dG(a)
=HIbdG(b)+ I adG(b)+A }dG(a)+AG(O)+ n<b-a)dG(b)dG(a)
By comparison of the calculated consumer surplus in the three different
cases, Proposition 3 follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
First, I show that the stand-alone value which makes the first entering firm
indifferent between selling to the first buyers at stage 2 and waiting, is lower
if the buyers' expectations are given by assumption 2 instead of by
assumption 1. Let al and a2 denote the cut off,given that assumption 1 and
assumption 2 respectively are applied. See (5).By comparing
al al +å(2n)-å(n)J (A(2n) - A(n))dG(b)+ Hal +A(2n) - A(n) - b)dG(b)
o ~
iiJ (A(2n) - A(n))dG(b) = o
al +å(2n)-å(n)
with
a2 a2+å(2n) iiJA(2n)dG(b) + Ha2 +A(2n) - b)dG(b) - J(A(2n) - A(n))dG(b) =0,
o a2 a2+å(2n)
it follows that al ~ a2. It is more valuable to have an installed base if the
buyers entering at stage 3 expect that all buyers will adopt the same
technology as the first entering buyers (assumption 2), than if they expect
co-ordination on the Pareto optimal choice (assumption 1). Proposition 4
followsfrom comparisons of Ml(A) with M2(A), Fl(A) with F2(A), and L!(A)
with L2(A):
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nj{a-å(7(~(~n) - A(n))dG(b) + ] (a - b)dG(b )}dG(a)
O O a-å(2,,)+å(,,)
< nj{a-1
2
") A(2n)dG(b)+ ] (a - b)dG(b)}dG(a)
O O a-å(2,,)
n
n 1{2 ] (a - b)dG(b) + a-å(7(~(~ b)dG(b) - a-å(7(~(~n) - A(n))dG(b)}
iiI a-å(2,,)+å(,,) O O
< n1.{2j!~-b)dG(b)+ ·T~-b)dG(b)- ·-F(2n)dG(b+G(a)
n
Fl < F2
and
a a+å(2,,)-å(,,)
v I(A(2n)-A(n))dG(b)+ I(A(2n)-A(n)+a-b)dG(b)
n I O
iiI
a G(a)
v-
I (A(2n) - A(n))dG(b)
a+å(2,,)-å(,,)
a+å(2,,)
a a+å(2,,)
v IA(2n)dG(b)+ I(A(2n)+a-b)dG(b)
< n I O v- a dG( a)
a
2
_ I(A(2n)-A(n))dG(b)
Proposition 4 follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
If the buyers' expectations are given by assumption 3, the two firms will
have different profit opportunities. Without loss of generality, suppose that
firm A has the technology which the buyers anticipate will be adopted as a
market standard. Since the firms are asymmetric, let all functions have a
subscript that tells which firms that are being studied (e.g. I1~(2,3) is the
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profit of firm A if firm A enters at stage 2 and firm B enters at stage 3).
Propositions 5a and 5b will be shown sequentially.
Will firm A find it profitable to enter before firm B? Given that it wants
to capture the first buyers at stage 2, firm A sets the price such that the
consumersurplus by adopting firm A's technology equals the expected
consumer surplus ofwaiting until stage 3.
4+A(2n) v 4+A(2n) v
a+ f~(2n)dG(b)+ f~(n)dG(b)-PA = fbdG(b)+ f(a+~(2n»)dG(b)
o a+A(2n) o· a+.(2n)
a+A(2n) v
PA = f(a+~(2n)-b)dG(b)- f(~(2n)-~(n»)dG(b)
O a+A(2n)
Consequently, firm A earns
a+A(2n)
npA +n f(a+~(2n)-b)dG(b)
o
a+A(2n) v
= 2n f (a +~(2n) - b)dG(b) - n f (~(2n) - ~(n»dG(b)
o a+A(2n)
given that it captures the first buyer.
Firm A compares the profit of capturing the first buyer at stage 2 with
the profit ofwaiting until stage 3:
va+A(2n)
II! (3,3) = 2nf f (a +~(2n) - b)dG(b)dG(a)
o o
A comparison of the expected profit of selling to the first buyer at stage 2 and
the expected profit of selling to both buyers at stage 3, II! (3,3), reveals that
firm A, independent of its stand-alone value, will wait until stage 3 before
sellingits technology. Hence, there is no gain byentering first, i.e., ~(~)= O.
In equilibrium, firm A will never want to introduce its technology before its
competitor.
Above, we have shown the first part of the proposition (fia); in the
equilibrium outcome firm A never enters before its competitor. The second
part (5b) remains to be shown:
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Will firm B enter before firm A in equilibrium? Firm B enters before
firm A if n; (2,2) < n! (3,2) and n~(2,3) > n~(3,3), i.e. M!(8) +F!(8) <C and
~(8» C. It will be shown that both inequalities cannot be satisfied
simultaneously.
a) Firm B's gain by being first, ~(8):
Ifboth firms enter at stage 3, firm B's profit is
v b-A(2n)
n~(3,3) = 2n I I (b -a - 8(2n»)dG(a)dG(b)
o o
If firm B enters first and captures the first buyers, it will set the price
such that the first buyer is indifferent between waiting and buying:
b-A(2n) b-A(2n) v
b + I 8(2n)dG(a) - PB = I (a + 8(2n»)dG(a) + I bdG(a)
o o b-A(2n)
b-A(2n)
PB = I (b - a)dG(a)
o
The profit, given that firm B captures the first buyers is:
b b-A(2n) b
nPB +nI (b - a)dG(a) =n I (b - a)dG(a)+ nI (b - a)dG(a)
o o o
Independent of b, the expected profit of selling at stage 2 exceeds the
b-A(2n)
expected profit of waiting, 2n I(b-a-8(2n»)dG(a). Hence, the profit of
o
sequential entry is:
v b-A(2n)
n~(2,3) = 2nI I (b - a - 8(2n»)dG(a)dG(b)
o o
+nJ{2b-J~(2n)dG(a)+ J (b-a)dG(a)}dG(b)
o o b-A(2n) I
v b-A(2n)
= 2n I I (b- a - 8(2n»)dG(a)dG(b) + L~(8)
o o
where
L~(8):= nJ{2b-J~(2n)dG(a)+ J (b-a)dG(a)}dG(b).
o o b-A(2n)
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b) Firm A's loss ofbeing second, F!(Il):
Firm A's profit if they both enter at stage 3:
v ø+A(2n)
n!(3,3) = 2nf f (a + 1l(2n) - b)dG(b)dG(a)
o o
Firm A's profit if firm B enters before firm A:
It is shown above that firm B will always capture the first buyer if it enters
first. Hence, firm A's profit is:
v ø
n!(3, 2) = nff (a - b )dG( b)dG( a)
o o
and the loss ofbeing second is:
ø+A(2n) a
f (a + 1l(2n) - b)dG(b) + f 1l(2n)dG(b)
O O dG(a)
ø+A(2n)
+ f(a+Il(2n)-b)dG(b)
v
F!(Il) = nf
o
a
c) Firm A's benefits ifboth firms enter at stage 2, M!(Il):
va+A(2n)
n!(2,2) = 2n f f (a + 1l(2n) - b)dG(b)dG(a)- C
o o
By comparison with n; (3,3), M!(Il) =O.
It follows that Z;(Il) > C implies F!(Il) > C. Hence, M!(Il) + F!(Il) < C
and l?B(Il) > C cannot hold simultaneously. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Compatibility will always be achieved if the firms enter simultaneously.
Hence, the government will only act if the firms enter sequentially. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that firm A enters first. A government
agency will only enforce standardisation if 21l> b - a > Il. In all other cases,
either standardisation will be the market outcome or incompatibility will be
the socially best outcome. Let us assume that firm A at stage 3 does not,
profit from a sale to the second buyer in the case where the government acts,
i.e., 21l> b - a> Il. (The technology offered by firm B at stage 3 is not allowed
to be adopted, and the incumbent technology is licensed without a fee.) A
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more advantageous policy towards an early entrant will strengthen the
incentives to enter early. The gain ofbeing first will increase from
L(A)= mAdG(b)+ "ItA+(a-b)}iG(b)- .J~G(b)}G(a)
to
L' (A)=mAdG(b)+ "ItA + (a - b)}iG( b) - .l:WG(b)}G(a).
It is straightforward to show that a ~ a' (use equation (5)). Hence
L' (A) > L(A).
The loss ofbeing the second firm increases from
F(A)= lVI' (b-a)dG(b)+ L (b-a)dG(b)+ .f.AdG(b>}aG(a)
to
F(A) =lVI' (b- a)dG(b)+ .l.(b- a)dG(b)+ "I:WG(b>}aG(a).
It follows that F (A) > F(A).
Since the loss of being second and the gain of being first increase, the
incentive to enter early is strengthened. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 4
In-eversibleChoice of Uncertain Technologies
with Network Externalities: Comment-
Abstract
In the setting introduced by Choi (1994) I show that it may be profit
maximising as well as sociallyoptimal to choosea low risk R&Dproject. This
result contradicts results in Choi (1994). Moreover, it is shown that this
result stands in a plausible model without network externalities but with
buyers who can delay their adoption ofa technology.
JEL classification: 031, L13, L40.
*1 am grateful for valuable comments from Geir B. Asheim and Per Erik Manne. This
research has been financed by Telenor and the Foundation for Research in Economics and
Business Administration.
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1. Introduction
In a recent paper published in thisjournal, Jay Pil Choi (1994) analyses the
private and the socially optimal risks of R&D projects in the presence of
network externalities. This paper discusses some of the conclusions in Choi
(1994).
Choi assumes that there are two buyers who enter the market
sequentially. In period 1, the first buyer enters the market. She has two
options, to adopt the technology offered in period 1, or to delay her adoption
until period 2 where a new technology is offered and the second buyer enters
the market. If the. first buyer adopts the incumbent technology in period 1,
the second buyer can choose between adopting the same technology and
capture the network externalities (standardisation benefits), or choose the
new technology. Consequently, neither the first nor the second buyer gets the
potential network externalities. Choi assumes that the first buyer can
observe which project the entering firm chooses before she decides whether to
wait or adopt the incumbent technology immediately. In such a setting Choi
claims: even though the social planner cannot decide whether the first buyer
should wait or not, he will choose the most risky project possible (Proposition
2), the socially best choice will not depend on whether the new technology
entering in period 2 is sponsored or not (Proposition 3), and that an entering
firm with exclus~ve rights to the new technology may choose a less risky
R&D project than the socially optimalone (Proposition 5). Choi applies the
same definition of increasing risk as first introduced by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970); the mean preserving spread criterion.
The purpose of this comment is to show that Propositions 2 and 3 are
incorrect. Since Choi uses Proposition 2 to prove Proposition 5, his proof of
Proposition 5 is invalid. The setting in section 2 is identical to the setting in
Choi (1994). In section 3, I show that in a plausible model without network
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externalities, a firm may choosea less risky R&Dproject than feasible. A low
risk project can be used by the firm to commit itself to a level of consumer
surplus which induces early buyers to wait until a new technology is
available.
2. Choi'smodel
I use the same notation as Choi (1994). Let a be the value of using the
incumbent technology in period 1 given that the technology is used by only
one player (stand-alone benefit). Assume that the incumbent technology is
mature and that its value, consequently,is unchanging over time.
The stand-alone benefit of adopting the new technology in period 2 is
given by Ø2 E [0,li], where Ø2 has a probability distribution F(·;8), whose
density function has support contained in [0, li]. Here 8 E [0,00) indicates the
riskiness of the new technology.An increase in 8 implies a mean preserving
spread (MPS)in the initial probabilitydistribution of P2.
j F(P2; 82 )dP2 ~ j F(P2; 81)dØ2 "\Ix E [0,li]
o o
if
Let A denote the value each user attaches to the network externalities
conferred when the other user adopts the same technology. The discount
factor is denoted by /j.
2.1 Nonsponsoredemerging technology
In Proposition 2, Choi concludes that the market-induced social welfare
increases with an MPS in the distribution of P2. This result is seemingly
plausible since Klette and de Meza (1986), Bhattacharya and Mookherjee
(1986), and Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) have achieved similar results in
models where the buyers cannot wait. However, I will show that an MPS will
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not necessarily be welfare improving if buyers can wait. This result is
maintained in a model without network externalities as well (see section 3).
Following Choi (1994), the first buyer has two options in period 1. If she
decides to wait (W) until period 2, her expected payoff is given by
V(W;II) =M +.{aFt a; Il)+1.ii,dF(,8,;II)]
= SA+ s[J ,8,dF(.ii,; Il) +!F(,8,; Il)d,8,J (1)
The last equality is shown in the appendix. If she decides to adopt (A) the
incumbent technology in period 1, her expected payoff is given by
V(A;8) = a+ o[a+AF(a+A;8)]. (2)
Let SM(x;8) be the expected social surplus when action x is taken in period 1
subject to the constraint that the period 2 decisions are made in the market,
where x = A, W . Then,
SM(W;8) = 2V(W;8) (3)
and
SM(A;8) = a+ oa+ o[(a+ 2A)F(a+ A;8)+ jP2dF(P2;8)]
a+A
= a + Sa +SAF(a +A; Il) + s[ J ,8,dF(,8, ;Il) + al~(,8,; Il)d,8, ]
= V(A; Il) + s[ J ,8,dF( ji,; Il) + aJ~(,8,; Il)d,8,} (4)
The second equality in (4) follows from the result in the appendix. The third
equality follows from (2).
I will here provide two independent arguments which separately make
the proof of proposition 2 incorrect, and show that social welfare may
decrease with increased risk.
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First, given that the first buyer adopts the incumbent technology in
period 1, SM(A;8), social welfare may - contrary to what Choi claims but does
not show in the proof of proposition 2 - decrease with an MPS in the
distribution of [32'
Considering (4), it follows directly from the definition of MPS, that
v
(a + L\)F( a + L\;8) + JP2dF(P2; 8) increases with an MPS. However, it cannot
a+å
be shown that this increase in general exceeds a possible reduction in
L\F( a + L\;8). The following counter example establishes this claim.
Let P2 be a uniform random variable on the interval [A - 8,132 + 8]
where [32 denotes the expected stand-alone value of the new technology. Let
the initial probability distribution be given by 8 = 1 and the new probability
distribution be given by 8 = 8N > 1, i.e., the new probability distribution can be
reached by an MPS of the initial distribution. Furthermore, let L\> 8N -1 and
2
a+L\=[32 +1. Straightforward calculations showthat SM(A;8N)-SM(A;1)<O.
Hence, it is possible that SM(A;8) may decrease with an MPS in the
distribution of P2' The intuition for this result is as follows. An MPS may
increase the probability of the second buyer adopting an incompatible
technology and this loss may, as in above example, exceed the gain from the
option effect discussed by Choi.
Second, Choi does not take into account that an MPS in the
distribution of [32 may induce the first buyer to adopt rather than wait, or vice
versa. I will show that an MPS can reduce social welfare also ifwe restrict our
attention to cases where social welfare, given adoption in period 1, increases
withanMPS.
If an MPS induces the first buyer to adopt rather than wait, or vice
versa, and this change reduces social welfare, the MPS may be
disadvantageous from a welfare perspective. This is only feasible if the R&D
project which makes the first buyer indifferent between waiting and adopting
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, O, differs from the project which makes waiting and adopting equally good
from a social perspective, B',
Defining O by v(w;O) = V(A;O), it follows from (1), (3), and (4) that
a+.å
SM(W;O) = V(A;O)+ v(w;O) = SM(A;O) - J F(Ø2;O)dØ2 + 8~.
a
Depending on the last two terms, the project which makes the buyer
indifferent between waiting and adopting can be more or less risky than the
project which makes a social planner indifferent between the alternatives,
. e' > eA e' < eAI.e., _ or _ .
I will provide an example where e' ~ O. Assume that development of a
new technology in period 2 either succeeds or fails.
Probability:
Success
Yo
Stand-alone value: e
Failure
1-Yo
O
Note that an increase in e implies an MPS of the initial probability
distribution. Suppose that the technological progress from period 1 to period 2
is represented by a probability distribution where either e = 5 or e = 7. Let
8 = 1, a =%' and ~ = 1%. The expected social welfare and the expected
consumer surplus of the first buyer can be calculated:
e=5 e=7
Consumer surplus
Adopting: 569{O5 589{O5
Waiting: 56Ko5 57Yt05
Social welfare
Adopting: 105/{O5 IlOYt05
Waiting: 113YI05 1159{O5
Table 1. Consumer surplus and social welfare
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If the probability distribution given by (}= 5 represents the technological
progress from period 1 to period 2, the first buyer chooses to wait until period
2, and themarket induced social welfare is 113YI05. However, ifthe relevant
probability distribution is given by (}= 7, the first buyer chooses to adopt the
incumbent technology immediately and the market induced social welfare is
11OYt05. Consequently, an MPS of the probability distribution reduces social
welfare. The outcome is illustrated in Figure 1.
SM (A;S)
SM (W;S)
V(A;S)
V(W;S)
~--~--------~--------~S
1 S S'
Figure 1. Consumer surplus and market induced social welfare
The bold lines indicate the first buyer's consumer surplus in equilibrium and
the market induced social welfare. In the example, the probability
distribution given by (}= 5 is less risky than the one given by (}= e, and the
other probability distribution is riskier, i.e., 5< e < 7. As shown in Figure 1, a
more risky project may reduce social welfare.
We can conclude that the market-induced social welfare may decrease
with an MPS. This result contradicts Proposition 2 inChoi (1994).
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2.2 Sponsored emerging technology
Propositions 3 and 5 in Choi (1994) apply Proposition 2. By using Choi's
example from the proof of Proposition 5, I will show that my objection to
Proposition 2 undermines the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5 as well.
Proposition 3 states that, given that the new technology introduced in
period 2 is sponsored, a social planner who can only control the riskiness of
the R&D project will prefer the most risky research strategy. To show that
Proposition 3 is incorrect, I use an example provided by Choi (see Choi (1994)
p. 394). Following Choi (1994), let a = 12, A= 15, /32 = 30, 8 = 1, and let !J2 be a
uniform random variable on the interval [30- 0,30 +O].
Choi calculates that the most risky R&D project which induces the
first buyer to wait, is given by 0=5 (a more risky project will induce the first
buyer to adopt in period 1). He also shows that the firm's profit is maximised
by choosing this low risk project. It can be shown that - as long as the first
buyer waits until the second period - the market induced welfare increases
with risk. Furthermore, given adoption of the incumbent technology in period
1, the market induced welfare will be maximised if the most risky project
possible (O = 30) is chosen. Since (a) O> 5 induces the first buyer to adopt in
period 1, and (b)it is straightforward to calculate that SM(W;O = 5) = 90 and
. that SM(A;O = 30) = 66.83, it follows that the finn's profit maximising choice is
sociallyoptimal.
This example shows that even if the new technology is sponsored, the
market induced social welfare is not necessarily maximised by choosing the
most risky R&D project. The example contradicts Proposition 3.
In Choi (1994), the above mentioned example is used to prove
Proposition 5 - a firm may choose a less risky research strategy than the
socially optimal one. Since I have shown that the firm's strategy in the
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example is, in fact, socially optimal, it follows that the proof of Proposition 5
is invalidated.
3. Amodel without network externalities but with waiting buyers
Choi (1994) shows that a firm may choose a low risk R&D project instead of
a high risk project in a market with network externalities. The purpose of this
section is to show that this is also a plausible outcome in markets without
network externalities. I show that the expected consumer surplus may be
larger if a low risk project is chosen than if a high risk project is chosen. By
committing itselfto a low risk project, a firm can in some cases induce buyers
entering the market early to wait until a new technology is ready for market
introduction.
As in the previous section, assume that the game consists of two
periods and that an established technology is competitively offered in period
1.Most of the notation in section 2 is kept in this section.
In period 2 three technologies are offered - two new technologies in
addition to the established technology. The two new technologies are
sponsored by two firms with exclusive rights to one technology each. For
simplicity, let the value of one of the new technologies be Å with certainty.
The value of the second new technology, /32' is stochastic. With probability,
Ye, the R&D project succeeds and the value of the new technology is e.With
the complementary probability, 1-Ye, the project fails and the value of the
new technology is O.An increase in 8 implies an MPS of the initial probability
distribution. This is similar to the second example introduced in section 2.1.
Furthermore, assume that the value of the certain technology (Å) is
sufficiently large to justify from a welfare perspective that adoption is
delayed until period 2, even if the uncertain R&D project does not succeed,
i.e., SÅ~ (1+ S)a.
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Since network externalities are absent in this model, it suffices to have
one buyer who enters in period 1. Following Choi (1994), I will assume that
the buyer observes which R&D project the firm chooses before she decides
whether to wait or to adopt inperiod 1.
In a market with price competition, the buyer gets the maximum
surplus that the firm with the second best technology can profitably offer.
Hence, the firm with an uncertain R&D project earns a positive profit only if
the project succeeds and the value of the technology ( e) exceeds the value of
the best competing technology (A). Therefore, the firm will always choose the
level of risk such that e >A.
The buyer considers the expected value of the second best technology
in period 2 when she decides whether to adopt a technology immediately or
wait. The second best technology in period 1 is either, a ifthe uncertain R&D
project fails, or A(c- a) if the uncertain R&D project succeeds. Consequently,
a buyer focuses only on the probability of success of the uncertain R&D
project (Ye), while a firm's profit depends both on the probability of success
(Ye) and on the difference between the value of its own technology and the
value of the second best technology (e - A).
The buyer will wait only if the expected surplus by waiting (V(W» is
larger than the surplus by adopting the established technology in period 1
(V(A». Since V(W) = (1- ,Ve)oa+ ,VeOA and V(A) = (1+ o)a, it follows that the
buyer adopts in period 1 if H> O(A - aYa. Hence, the firm's profit, TI, as a
function of the riskiness of the R&D project, e, is given by:
if
if
Since the profit is increasing with risk as long as the buyer waits, the profit is
maximised by choosing the most risky R&D project that induces the buyer to
it:« = ~(A - a) /
WID. o/a'
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Also welfare is increased with risk as long as the buyer waits.
Moreover, as noted above, from a welfare perspective it is desirable that the
buyer waits. It followsthat - if a social planner does not control the buyer's
adoption decision - the socially optimal project is the most risky project that
induces the buyer to wait. Hence, the firm's profit maximising low risk R&D
decision is also sociallyoptimal.
4. Conclusion.
First, I show that in the model introduced by Choi (1994), a welfare
maximising social planner as well as a firm may prefer a low risk R&D
project to a high risk project. This result contradicts Propositions 2 and 3 in
Choi (1994).It also undermines the proofofProposition 5.
Second, I introduce a simple model without network externalities. In
this model, I show that, given that the social planner cannot control the
buyers' adoption of a new technology, both the social planner and the firm
may prefer a less risky R&Dproject to a more risky project available. Like in
Choi (1994), the firm commits itself to a low risk R&D project in order to
induce the first buyer to wait. Consequently, the choiceof a lowrisk project is
plausible in a market both with and without network externalities.
These results differ from the findings of Klette and de Meza (1986),
Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), and Dasgupta and Maskin (1987)who
show that a risk neutral firm prefers the most risky R&Dproject available,
given that the projects are equally costly. The background for this difference
is that Choi (1994) and the present comment study models where it matters
when the buyers' adopt. In such a setting it follows that a low risk R&D
project can be chosen in equilibrium.
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Appendix
v v x
Here, I show that xF( x, O) + f f32dF(f32' O) is equal to f f32dF(f32' O) + f F(f32' O~f32:
x o o
v - v
xF(x,O)+ ff32dF(f32,0)=XF(x,0)+f32F(f32'0)[ - f F(f32,0)df32
x x
= li- J F(f32,0)df32
x
= li- JF(f32' O)df32 + J F(f32' O)df32
o o
= J f32dF(f32 ' O) + JF(f32' O)df32.
o o
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Chapter 5
R&Dwhen Adoption is Irreversible-
Abstract
I study firms' timing of R&D in an emerging market where the buyers enter
sequentially and adopt a technology only once. Contrary to in the preemption
and patent race literature, early introduction of a new technology is assumed
not to alter later firms' possibilities of introducing competing technologies. I
show that the incentives for early introduction exceed the welfare optimal
ones. Sequential development of new technologies implies temporal product
differentiation which may benefit both firms. The firms may race into a new
market, although they would have been better off by mutually entering later.
JEL Classification: L13, 031.
*1 am grateful for valuable comments from Geir B. Asheim and Tørres Trovik. This
research has been financed by Telenor and the Foundation for Research in Economics and
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1. Introduction
Often adoption of a technologyis irreversible. Potential users of a technology
have to decide whether to adopt a present technology or to wait until new
technologies have been developed. If she waits the user loses the value of
obtaining the existing technologynow, but and gains the value ofobtaining a
possibly better technologylater.
When users make irreversible adoptions oftechnologies,the future and
present demand are interlinked. Buyers adopting a technology today do not
adopt a future technology. Since demand conditions are important for firms'
R&Defforts, it followsthat there is a link between R&Ddecisions over time
which is different from the interdependence due to technological spillovers or
due to existing patents which restrict competitors' R&Defforts. This article
studies how irreversible adoption decisions by users influence firms' R&D
decisions and compares the firms' R&Dincentives with the socially optimal
ones.
I introduce a model with two periods, where buyers with identical
preferences enter sequentially. Before two competing firms introduce their
technologiesin the last period, a firm may invest in an uncertain R&Dproject
to introduce a new technology before it faces competition. Furthermore, I
assume that the firms entering late are always able to offer better
technologies than the one introduced early. The firms engage in price
competition and are assumed to be unable to enter into sales contracts with
buyers before their new technologyis developed.
In the article, I show that if buyers make irreversible adoption
decisions, a firm's incentive to develop a new technology before the
competitors exceeds the socially optimal one. In a market with price
competition the firm must have the best technology to be profitable, and the
buyers get the maximum consumer surplus that the firm with the second
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best technology at most can offer profitably. However, if a firm introduces a
new technology before its competitors, the firm achieves two advantages.
First, the buyers are willing to pay more for obtaining a given technology
earlier. Second, the firm will only need to compete with the second best
technology introduced in the period in which the competitors enter. This is
because the buyers anticipate that if they wait, they will only be offered the
most consumer surplus the firm with the second best technology can
profitably offer. The first reason for entering early is not only advantageous
from the firm's perspective, but also from a social perspective. The second
reason, however, does not represent a social gain. The buyers should wait if
the best technology justifies waiting, not only if the expected value of the
second best technology justifies waiting. Hence, I will show that a firm may
have excessive incentives to develop a new technology early.l
We may note that these incentives to enter early differ from the
incentives studied in the literature about preemption (see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) Fudenberg et al. (1983), Gilbert and Newbery (1982), and
Reinganum (1981». In this literature the argument relies on the assumption
that a firm's early introduction of a new technology prevents or delays
competitors' development of competing technologies. In the patent race
literature, an early discovery of a technology prevents competition until the
patent expires (see Reinganum (1989) for a review of the patent race
literature). My argument for early development of a new technology differs
from the one put forward in this literature. Price competition leads to
excessive profitability oftemporal product differentiation.
lThe importance of technological expectations for the adoption decision has been pointed
out by e.g. Rosenberg (1976), Balcer and Lippman (1984) and Kamien and Schwartz
(1972). Contrary to these articles, I focus on oligopolistic pricing of prospective technologies
and how this pricing influences the adoption of the present technology. (See also Ireland
and Stoneman (1986) for a discussion of the pricing of prospective technologies in a
different setting.)
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This article is related to the growing literature on irreversible
investments. In this literature optimal timing of an investment, in an
irreversible project in which the value of the project follows a continuous time
stochastic process, is studied. See McDonald and Sigel (1986), Baldwin (1982)
and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Unlike mine.however, the above studies do not
analyse how the users' adoption decisions influence a firm's incentive to
develop new technologies. The presence of investment opportunities is
assumed to be exogenous in this literature.
In Section 2, the model is presented. In Section 3, I analyse the
situation in which the firm developing the first technology is assumed to not
make the transition to the next generation of the technology. Section 4
covers the situation where a firm considers when to develop a new technology
given the introduction date of its competitor (the competitor's entry date is
fixed). In Section 5, the model is extended to the situation where two
competing firms decide simultaneously when to introduce a new technology.
Section 6 presents the conclusions and suggests directions for further
research and possible extensions of the model.
2. Themodel
To focus on how irreversible adoption decisions influence firms' R&D efforts,
assume that there are two identical buyers who enter the market
sequentially. The first buyer enters in period 1 and the second in period 2.2
If a technology obtained in period 1 generates x in total consumer
benefits during the two periods, it is assumed that the total benefits can be
2Assuming only one buyer arriving in each period should not be considered as a serious
limitation of this model. If we allowed for a certain number of buyers in each period, the
analysis would be almost identical to the one presented here, and lead only to minor
changes in the interpretation ofthe results.
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divided into the benefits ofusing the technology in period 1, ~x, and the
. l+u
benefits of using the technology in period 2, _§_x. Hence, the value of
1+8
obtaining the same technologyin period 2 is only ~ x.
l+u
Three different cases will be considered. First, we analyse the situation
where a firm considers developinga new technologyin period 1knowing that
two other firms will compete in period 2. This assumption applies in markets
where the firm developingthe first generation ofa technologyis different from
the firms developing later generations.f Being successful in an emerging
market may require different capabilities than being successful in a more
mature market. For instance, the first entering firm may have an advantage
in product innovation and the firms entering later may be better in process
innovations.
In the second case, a firm's incentives to introduce a technology before
its competitor are discussed. Knowing that the competitor will introduce a
new technology in period 2, a firm decides whether to introduce its own
technologyin period 1or 2.
In the third case, the situation where two competing firms can decide
when to introduce a new technology is considered. The firms choose
simultaneously period 1 or period 2 as the date for the introduction of their
new technologies.
The followingassumptions are commonfor all three cases. Given that
two firms decide to develop a new technology in the same period, they are
assumed to be equally capable of developing a new technology. An R&D
project undertaken in period 2 is assumed to result in a better technology
3Foster (1986) estimatesthat seven of every ten leaders in an established technology fail
to make the transition to the next generation of technology. See also Rosen (1991) for a
discussion of why small firms tend to make a disproportionately large share of major
innovations while larger firms often concentrate on minor innovations.
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than any technology introduced in period 1. General technological progress
makes it possibleto developbetter technologiesin period 1 than in period 2.
Let an R&D project in period 1 cost r. If a firm undertakes an R&D
project, the outcome or the value of the resulting new technology is
stochastic. Assume the value of a new technology is a non-negative real
number with support [0,v]. The probability distribution is given by F(·). An
investment in R&Denables the firm to offer a new technology at the outset
of period 1. Furthermore, let the value of a new technology in period 2 have
support [m, m], where vS; m since a technology in period 2 is always better
than a technologyintroduced earlier. The probability distribution is given by
GO. For simplicity, assume that there are no R&Dcosts in period 2.4
The production costs are ignored for simplicity;consequently, the value
of a new technology should be interpreted as the net valuation of the new
product.
The first buyer and a firm entering in period 2 are assumed to be
unable to enter into a sales contract before the technology to be sold is
developed.f The firms engage in price competition.
3. Case 1: Incentives to introduce a technology early
Consider a firm's decision to invest in an R&D project before other firms
develop their technologies. Firm Al can invest r in an R&D project which
results in a technology with value al e [0,v]. The technology introduced in
period 1 faces competition from the two technologies introduced in period 2,
tlz,b2 e [m,m].
4Scherer (1967) discusses why R&D costs are often larger in an early introduction of a new
technology than in a late introduction.
5See Williamson (1985) for a discussion of why contracting about uncertain future events
can be difficult to arrange. Also Aghion and Bolton (1987) discusses this assumption.
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The finn'sl R&D decision
Finn Al will compare the expected revenue of developing a new technology
with the fixed R&D costs, and invest if the revenue exceeds the R&D costs.
The first buyer adopts a technology in period 1 if the net benefits of adoption
exceed the expected net benefits of waiting until new technologies are
developed in period 2. Since the firms engage in price competition, the buyer
will, in period 2, obtain the expected benefits the finn with the second best
technology at most can offer profitably, r:
r:= 8~ E[min(a2,b2)].l+u
Given that finn Al has a more valuable technology than the expected
benefits ofwaiting, its profit will be al - r.Hence, the expected profit of an
R&D investment in period 1 is
V
rIAl = E[(al - r)l(al' r)] - r = f (al - r)dF(aJ - r
r
(1)
where 10 is an indicator function, defined as I(x,y) = l if x ~ y, and I(x,y) =O
otherwise. Finn Al maximises its profit by investing in R&D if and only if the
costs are less than
(2)
A welfare maximising social planner's incentive to invest in R&D may differ
from the finn's incentive.
First best:
A social planner does not only take into account the profit of finn Al' but also
the other firms' profit and the buyers' net benefits. Let us first consider the
first best situation, where a social planner can decide the pricing of the
technology developed by finn Al' Given that the first buyer waits until the
prospective technologies are developed (period 2), the social welfare induced
by the first buyer's adoption equals the expected benefits of adopting the best
technology in period 2:
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X:= 8~E(max(~,b2)]'
l+u
It is welfare maximisingto let the first firmadopt the technology introduced
in period 1 only if the value of this technology exceeds the expected social
value of waiting. Hence, the expected welfare gain of an R&D project in period
1is
il
WFB= E((~ - X )I(al' X) ] - r = f (al - X )dF( ~) - r.
x
(3)
The social welfare is maximised given an R&D project is undertaken only if
the R&D costs are less than:
(4)
If ~<X, the social planner chooses a price above al - r to induce the first
buyer to wait. However, if al 2: X, a price equal to ~ - X will induce the first
buyer to adopt the technology introduced first, and leave the first firm with a
profit identical to the welfare gain of the adoption.f Hence, the firm's expected
profit of an R&D project will coincide with the welfare gain of the project.
Second best:
Suppose that a social planner can only decide whether the first firm should
invest in R&D or not. The firm chooses the profit maximising price.
A study of the optimal R&D incentives in second best might be
relevant for a situation where a government agency has an impact on firms'
R&D efforts, but does not control the firms' prices.?
The first firm will capture the first buyer if the value of its technology
exceeds the buyer's expected benefits of waiting, i.e. ~ 2: r. Hence, the
6Note that the social planner imposes a price that is lower than the price in an
unregulated market, i.e. al - r> al - X·
7Examples include R&D subsidies to firms, tax refunds for income spent on R&D, research
undertaken by universities that help firms to introduce new technologies.
-132-
expected welfare gain of an R&D investment in period 1 given that a social
planner controls the R&D decision, but not the price, is:
ii
W SB = E[ (ilt - Z )I( ilt, r)] - r = J(ilt - Z )dF( ilt ) - r (5)
r
A new technology should only be developed if the R&D costs are less than
rSB:= E[(al - z)I(ap r)]. (6)
Priyate R&D incentives compared to the socially best
We are now ready to compare the firm's R&D decision with the best decision
seen from a welfare maximising social planner's point of view:
Proposition 1
From a welfare perspective, firm Al has excessive incentives to develop a new
technology before the competing firms enter: rSB < rFB < ro.
Proof: It followsfrom the definitions of rand Z that Z> r. Hence, by (2), (4),
and (6) it follows that rSB < rFB < ro· Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 1can be explained as follows.The first buyer will
compare the net benefits of adopting immediately with the expected net
benefits ofwaiting. She does not take into account that waiting will increase
the expected profit of later firms. Hence, the first buyer is willing to pay more
for the technology offered in period 1 than the welfare gain induced by
immediate adoption and, consequently, the first fum's incentives to develop a
new technology exceed the sociallyoptimal ones. By (1), (3), and (5), we can
decompose the difference between profit and welfare gain of an R&D project
inperiod 1:
or (7)
where
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X TI
T:= J (~ - r)dF( al)+ J (X - r)dF( al) and,
r x
z
L:= J(x-al)dF(aJ.
r
T represents a transfer from the first buyer's consumer surplus to the first
firm's profit, compared with the case where the buyer obtains the expected
value of the best technology in period 2 by waiting. Viewed separately, this
transfer does not result in a welfare loss. L represents the expected welfare
loss due to the fact that the buyer adopts the first technology even when the
socially welfare would have been larger if she had waited, i.e. ale [r,x].
Figure 1 illustrates the price, gross social gain (wFB + r), transfer (T)
and loss related to inefficient adoption of a new technology (L):
Gross
social gain
(WFB +r)O~--------~~------~----~~--~'_--~al
Price
Figure 1. Welfare and profit of an R&D project in period 1
A social planner who does not control the adoption decision may prefer not to
undertake an R&D project in period 1 even if there are no R&D costs (r =O).
lfthe expected welfare loss due to inefficient adoption in period 1 is large (i.e.
ifit is likely that ale[r,x]), it follows that the expected social.value of an
R&D project not including the costs can be negative.
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We may also note that the first firm competes with the later firms, but
that the later firms do not compete with the first firm. The first firm's offer
has to exceed the expected benefits of waiting. However, given that the first
buyer waits, the firms entering in period 2 will compete with each other and
ignore the first firm. This asymmetry between the first and later firms is an
advantage for the first firm because it reduces the first buyer's expected
benefits of waiting and, consequently, makes the first buyer more inclined to
adopt the technology introduced early.
Suppose the first buyer buys a product in period 1 as well as period 2,
e.g. the product is a consumer good. With this assumption, the supply and
demand in periods 1 and 2 can be viewed as two separate markets. The firm
entering first captures the buyer's value ofhaving a product early, which is
the same as the social benefits ofintroducing a product in period 1. Similarly,
the later firms will only capture the social value of their technology
introductions. Hence, in the case with a consumer good, the incentives for
early development of a new technology will coincide with the socially optimal
ones.
R&D incentives and the competition between prospective technologies
The first buyer's incentives to wait are weaker than the socially optimal
ones, because she must share the welfare gain of waiting with the firms in
period 2. Hence, if the first buyer obtains a larger share of the welfare gain
induced by waiting (and the expected profit of the last firms decreases
proportionally), the difference between the buyer's and the socially optimal
incentives to wait will diminish. Let ne {1,2} be the number of buyers in
period 2 and let II2 denote one of the two firms' profit+
x-r= 1:8E[1~ -b21]=2~2
SIf the first buyer adopts a technology in period 1, there will be only one buyer in period 2.
Otherwise, there will be two buyers.
-135-
It follows that an increase in the expected profit in period 2 increases the
difference between the social and the buyer's gain from waiting and,
consequently, the bias toward premature development of a new technology is
amplified.
The riskiness of the R&D projects in period 2 may play an important
role in the division of the social gain between the buyers and the firms. Let us
assume that the probability distribution of a riskier R&D project can be
reached by a mean preserving spread (MPS) in the probability distribution to
a less risky R&D project (Rothschild and Stigliz (1970)).
We can now study the impact of riskier R&D projects in period 2:
Proposition 2
If the R&D projects in period 2 become riskier (i.e. an MPS in the probability
distribution),
a) the welfare gain of an R&D investment in period 1declines.
b) the profit of an R&D investment in period 1rises.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The expected value of the best technology in period 2 will increase with the
riskiness of the R&D projects (see the proof of Proposition 2). Consequently,
from a social perspective, a better technology will be necessary in period 1 to
justify immediate adoption instead of waiting until prospective technologies
are available. Since the welfare induced by waiting increases, it follows that
the social benefits of an R&D investment in period 1 diminish.
Moreover, the expected value of the second best technology in period 2
,
decreases with an MPS in the distribution of the outcome of the R&D
projects. Consequently, the first buyer's expected benefit from waiting
declines, and the firm introducing a technology in period 1 will face less
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competition from the technologies introduced later. Due to less competition,
the expected profit of an R&D investment in period 1 grows. We can conclude
that the more uncertain the R&D projects in period 2 become, the larger the
difference between the first firm's incentives to invest in R&D and the
socially optimal incentives will be.
4. Case2: Incentives to develop a technology before a
competitor
Suppose a firm anticipates when the competing firm will introduce its
technology. The firm can choose whether it will introduce its own technology
at the same date or earlier. Assume that firm B introduces its technology in
period 2 and that firm A can advance its introduction of a new technology
from period 2 to period 1. Furthermore, let firms A and B be the only firms in
the market.
In order to decide the date for introduction of a new technology, firm A
will compare the expected profit of entry in period 1, Ilfl), with the expected
profit of entry in period 2, ll(2):
Period 1: ll
v
ll(l) = -E[~] - r = -J~dF(~) - r.
1+8 1+80
(8)
Period 2:
(9)
Suppose firm A decides to develop a technology in period 1. To capture the
first buyer it must offer larger net benefits than the buyer, can obtain by
waiting. Since the firms engage in price competition, and firm B in period 2
will introduce a better technology than the one already developed by firm A,
the net benefit of waiting is 8 ~al' Hence, ~al is firm A's profit
l+u l+u
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maximising price in period 1. This price equals the difference between the
buyer's gross benefits of obtaining firm A's technology in period 1, ap and the
benefits ofwaiting, 8 ~ lZt. The expected profit is given by (8).9
1+0
Firm A maximises its profit by investing in R&D in period 1 if and only
if n(l) > n(2). By advancing the introduction of a new technology, firm A puts
itselfin a weaker position when facing the competition from firm B in period
2. Since firm A has a less valuable technology than it would have had by
developing the technology later (in period 2), firm B can raise its price and still
offer larger net benefits than firm A at most can offer profitably.
Furthermore, a price increase in period 2 makes the first buyer willing to pay
more for the technology offered in period 1, and, hence, firm A will earn more
in period 1. A strategy where a firm profits from committing itself to a
nonaggressive action and thereby induces a more favourable response from
its competitor is often referred to as a "puppy dog" strategy (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984».
The firm's timing of R&D can be compared with the socially best
decision. Let '0(1), 'FB(l), and 'sB(l) denote the criticallevels of extra R&D
costs due to early development for, respectively, the firm, a social planner
controlling prices (first best), and a social planner controlling the R&D
decision (second best). Only if the extra R&D costs are less than the critical
level will the decision-maker advance the development of a new technology to
the first period.
9Recall that there is only one buyer in period 1.
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Proposition 3
From a welfare perspective, firm A has excessive incentives to enter before firm
B: ro (I) < rFB(I) < rsB(I).
Proof: See the Appendix.
If firm A develops a technology in period 2, its profit will be identical to the
welfare gain of the R&D project: due to price competition, firm A will be able
to capture the positive difference between the value of its own technology and
firm B's technology. This difference is the same as the social benefits (not
including the R&D costs) of an R&D project in period 2. However, if the firm
advances its development of a new technology, the profit will exceed the
welfare gain. The buyer does not get the total social benefits of waiting and
will, hence, be inclined to pay more for the technology in period 1 than the
social gain.
5. Case3: Both firms can advance their development of new
technologies.
In this section we consider the case where firms A and B decide
simultaneously when to develop a new technology. To find the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in this setting, we need to analyse
the firms' profits in four feasible outcomes: both firms enter in period 1, the
firms enter sequentially, and both firms enter in period 2.
Let Il(i,j) be the profit of a firm that develops a new technology for
period i E {1,2} given the competitor develops his technology for period
j E {1,2}.lO Furthermore, let the value offirm A's technology still be al or a2
lOSince the firms ex ante are identical, the firms' profit functions are also identical.
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depending on whether it is developed in period 1 or 2, respectively. Similarly,
let the value of finn B's technology be hl or h2•
The profit from entering before the competitor and the profit if both
firms enter in period 2 were already calculated in (8) and (9), i.e. 0(1,2) = 0(1)
and 0(2,2) = 0(2). The profit of entering after the competitor is
0(2,1) = 1: 8 (E[~] - E(h1]),
and the profit of mutual entry inperiod 1is
(10)
(11)
Having calculated the expected profit in the four feasible subgames where
the timing of entry is taken as given, we can now focus on the timing of entry.
Figure 2 illustrates the feasible outcomes:
FirmB
FirmA
1 2
0(1,1) 0(1,2)
1
0{1,1) 0(2,1)
0(2,1) 0(2,2)
2
0{1,2) , 0(2,2)
Figure2. Timing
The firms' timing of R&D depends on the comparison of the different profit
levels. Since the firms' profit functions are assumed to be identical, we only
have to compare 0(1,1) with 0(2,1) and 0(1,2) with 0(2,2), to find the
equilibrium outcomes:
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rm.n ne.n nu.a) ll(2,2) Equilibriumoutcomes
I > > (1,1)
Il > < (1,1) (2,2)
III < > (1,2) (2,1)
IV < < (2,2)
Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes
In the brackets in the right-hand column, firm A's and firm B's timing ofR&D
are put first and second, respectively (e.g. (1,2) means that firm A develops a
technology in period 1 and firm B develops a technology in period 2). There are
four different situations:
I.Racing
Both firms develop a new technology early. Racing is a unique equilibrium
outcome if investment in R&D in period 1is a dominant strategy for both
firms.
It follows from a comparison of the different profit levels that the
incentives for early development of a new technology will be strengthened if
the expected difference between two technologies developed in period 1
increases or the expected difference in period 2 decreases.U A reduction in the
R&D costs related to early development of a new technology (r ) will also
strengthen the incentives to develop a technology early.12
11ll(I,I) - ll(2,1) increases with an increase of E[lal - bIl]. ll(I,2) - ll(2,2) increases if
E[I~ - b21] declines.
12Note also that the incentives to enter early also increase ifthe expected value ofhaving
a technology in period 1 increases, i.e. ll(l, 2) - ll(2, 2) increases with an increase in
_I_E[ ]1+8 ~.
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Both firms may have earned more if they mutually delayed their R&D
investments until period 2, i.e. 0(2,2) > 0(1,1). A situation such as this
resembles the well-known prisoners' dilemma game.
II. Racing or late entry depending on the expectations.
This is the case where a firm will develop a new technology early if and only if
it expects that the competitor will do so as well. In particular, if the firm
expects that the competitor will develop a new technology late, it will do the
same. Hence, the realised equilibrium outcome might be Pareto dominated by
another equilibrium outcome.P
III. Temporal product differentiation
The firms choose to develop a technology at a different date than their rival.
Temporal product differentiation weakens competition and increases the
profit of at least one firm. Since 0(1,2) > 0(2,2) holds in equilibrium, the firm
which decides to advance its development of a new technology raises its
profit. It is possible that both firms will earn more if one decides to enter in
period 1. This will be the outcome ifthe profit increase ofless competition in
period 2 exceeds the loss due to the rival capturing the first buyer: both firms
gain if one plays the "puppy dog" strategy.
IV. Late entry
If the extra R&D cost of early entry or the expected value of having a
technology in period 1is small, none of the firms will decide to develop a new
technology early. Hence, late entry of both firms is a unique equilibrium
outcome.
13The welfare of the buyers is not taken into account.
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Welfare analysis:
The firm's profit maximising choice given the rival's action can be compared
with the socially best choice assuming that the social planner controls the
R&D decision but not the pricing decision (second best):
Proposition 4
If the firms enter sequentially, social welfare will never improve if the last firm
advances its entry toperiod 1.
If both firms enter in period 2, social welfare will never improve if one of the
firms advances its entry toperiod 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 5
If the firms enter sequentially, social welfare may improve if the first firm
delays its entry toperiod 2.
If both firms enter in period 1, social welfare may improve if both firms delay
their entries to period 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
From a welfare perspective, there are two potential problems: First, if a firm
expects that the competitor will enter late, it will have excessive incentives to
enter early. However, ifthe competitor is expected to enter early, the firm's
incentives to advance its entry coincide with the socially best ones. This can
make mutual entry in period 1, and sequential entry equilibrium outcomes,
although socialwelfare is maximised by mutuallate entry. Second, there
might exist two equilibria which induce different levels of social welfare. In
case II (see Table 1) both mutual entry in period 1 and mutual entry in period
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2 are equilibrium outcomes, but only one of the outcomes is the socially
optimal one. Hence, the realised equilibrium outcome might be inferior from a
social perspective.
6. Conclusionand further directions
This article examines firms' incentives to invest in R&D given that a buyer
only adopts a technology once: adoption is irreversible. This feature makes
the present demand and the future demand interdependent. If a technology is
adopted today, the buyer will not buy a new technology tomorrow.
In a simplemodel where two buyers with identical preferences enter
the market sequentially, three situations are studied: First, I focus on a firm's
incentives to develop a new technology (invest in R&D) in an emerging
market where an early firm anticipates that other firms will enter and
capture the market when the market becomes more mature. It is shown
that the firm's incentives to enter an emerging market early on exceed the
socially best incentives.
In the second case, I study a firm's incentives to advance its
development of a new technology from the date where the competitor enters
to an earlier date. An early R&D investment is assumed to result in a less
valuable technology than the technology introduced by a later rival, but the
first firm will be able to capture the first buyer before the rival has introduced
its technology. I show that the firm may prefer to enter early and, hence,
have a less valuable technology than its rival when the last buyer enters. By
being a weaker competitor when the rival enters than it would have been by
entering at the same time, it induces the other firm to raise its price. The
early firm's profit will increase because the first buyer is willing to pay more
for the technology introduced first when it becomes more expensive to adopt
the prospective technology. By using the terminology introduced by
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1984),wemay say that the firm followsa "puppydog"
strategy: the firm profits by committing itself to nonaggressive action since
this induces a more favorable response from the competitor. The incentives
to enter early will also in this case exceedthe sociallybest ones.
The argument for.premature development of a new technology
presented here differs from the argument in the literature about preemption
or patent races. Contrary to this literature, the argument here does not
depend on the first mover's ability to delay or deter later firms' R&D
investments by introducing a technology early. In this article, I show that
price competition leads to excessive profitability of temporal product
differentiation.
In the third case, the situation where both firms can choose their
timing of R&D and, consequently, the date for introduction of a new
technology, is studied. I show that both firms may choose to race into the
market byentering early, although they both would have been better off
entering late. It is also pointed out that sequential entry implies temporal
product differentiation and less competition. Consequently, both firms may
find it desirable that one of the firms advances its R&D investment. The
equilibrium outcomeis comparedwith the welfaremaximising outcome.
There are various directions in which the analysis may be extended.
First, the analysis can be extended to include technologicalspillovers.Second,
the firms may decide on other characteristics of their R&D projects than
timing (e.g. a firm may increase its R&D investment to raise the expected
value of its new technology or the firms may influence the correlation
between their R&D projects). Third, we may let R&D conducted early on
influence the R&Ddecisions of later firms. Consequently, the first entering
firms will take into account how their own R&D investments change the
followers' investments. This extension will incorporate some of the features
from the literature about preemption. Although these extensions will give
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further realism to the analysis in the model, it is stilllikely that the forces
discussed in this article will prevail inan extended model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Let probability function G2(-) represent an MPS in the initial distribution
x x
function Gl (-): JG2 (t)dt ~ JGl (t)dt. Given the first buyer chooses to wait until
Q! Q!
i = {1,2}
The second equality follows by integration by parts. An MPS in the
probability distribution of ~ and b2 increases the expected value of the best
technologyat period 2:
liro - IG,(b,)db, }dG.(a,):;; liro - IG,(b,)db, }dG.(a,):;; liro - IG,(b,)db, }dG,(a,)
ro ro
!he first inequal~ty follows from JGI(b2)db2 = JG2(b2)db2 and
a> x a> a> a>JG(b2)db2 = JG(b2~b2 + JG(b2)de, x E [m,m l· The-last inequality follows from
a> a> a> x
the fact that m - JG2(b2)db2 is a convexfunctionin ~.
a2
Since the expected value of the best technology in period 2 increases,
the minimum value of the best technologyin period 1 that makes immediate
adoption socially beneficial increases. Consequently, the social value of
investment in an R&Dproject in period 1 diminishes with an MPS in the
probabilitydistribution in period2.
Part b) of Proposition 2 remains to be shown. In the market
equilibrium, the consumerbenefits ofwaiting are:
8 8 ro{a2 ro }
1+ 8E[ min(tlz,b2)] = 1+ 8! !b2dGi(b2)+ l tlzdGi(b2) dGi(~)
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The second equality follows by integration by parts. Recall that E(~] = E[b2].
An MPS will not change the expected value of the outcome of an R&D
project, but increase the last term and, consequently, reduce the expected
consumer benefits ofwaiting:
~~ ~~ ~~f f Gl (b2)db2dGI (~) s f f G2(b2)db2dGI (a2) s f f G2(b2)db2dG2(~)
The first inequality follows immediately from the definition of MPS. The last
a2
inequality follows from the fact that f G2(b2)db2 is a convex function in ~. A
ro
reduction of the expected consumer benefits of waiting increases the profit of
the firm introducing a new technology in period 1 (see (1». Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
First let us calculate the social gain of an R&D project in period 1 given that
the social planner controls the pricing (first best), wFB(l), and given that the
social planner only controls the R&D decision (second best), wsB(l).
First best: WFB(i) =) (lit - 1:SE(I.>,l)aF(a,l - r (Al)
l+oE[b2]
Second best: wsB(I)= J( lit - l:sE(l.>,l)aF(lItl-r (A2)
Comparing (8), (Al), and (A2), it follows that II(l) > WFB(2) > wsB(2).
If both technologies are developed in period 2, the best technology will
be adopted by both buyers. Hence, there will be no need for a social planner to
act. Due to price competition, firm A will, given that it has the best
technology, earn the difference between the values of the first and second
best technologies. Hence, firm A's profit is identical to the social gain of entry
in period 2: II(2) = WFB(2) = wsB(2). Since ro (1):=rIII(l) = II(2),
rFB(l):= rlwFB(l) = WFB(2), and rsB(1):= rlwsB(l) = wsB(2), it follows from
II(l) > WFB(2) > wsB(2) and II(2) = WFB(2) = wsB(2) that ro(1) < rFB(l) < rsB(l).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4:
Suppose that a firm enters in period 1. The social gain if the other firm also
enters in period 1 is identical to the expected difference between the value of
its own technology and the competing technology value (given the difference
is positive) subtracting the development costs, r. Hence, the social gain of
early entry will be identical to the profit, TI(l,l). Similarly, the social gain of
entry inperiod 2will be identical to the profit, TI(1,2). It follows that ifthe firm
(in equilibrium) enters in period 2, it will never improve social welfare by
entering in period 1.
Suppose that a firm enters in period 2. It follows from the proof of
Proposition 3 that the other firm has stronger incentives to advance the
entry from period 2 to period 1 than the social optimal ones. Hence, we can
conclude that if (2,2) is the equilibrium outcome, the social welfare will never
improve given that one of the firms advances its entry.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
From the proof of Proposition 3, we have that the profit of entering before the
other firm exceeds the welfare gain. Hence, there exist values of r for which a
firm enters before the competitor.
From Table 1, we have that if Ilfl.I) > TI(2,1), (1,1) is a feasible
equilibrium outcome. If {TI(l,l) - TI(2,1)} >O> wsB(l,l) - wsB(2,2), (2,2) is the
socially best outcome, but (1,1) is an equilibrium outcome. Hence, the last
part of the proposition can be established by an example satisfying the above
inequality. The example: In period 1, an R&D project has only two feasible
outcomes. The probability of success is 0.5 and the value of the technology is
32. Ifthe project fails the value of the technology is o. In period 2, all projects
succeed and the value of the technology is 32. Let r = 3. Straightforward
calculations show that (1,1) is a possible equilibrium outcome and that (2,2)
is the socially best outcome. Q.E.D.
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